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ABSTRACT
This Article examines urgent risks resulting from outer space
activities under the current space law regime. Emerging literature
alarmingly predicts that the risk of a catastrophe that ends the human
species this century is approximately 10–25%. Continued space
development may increase, rather than decrease, overall existential risk
due in part to crucial and identifiable market failures. Addressing these
shortcomings should take priority over the competing commercial,
scientific, and geopolitical interests that currently dominate in space
policy. Sensible changes, including shifting space into a closed-access
commons as envisioned by the 1979 Moon Treaty, may help in achieving
existential security.
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INTRODUCTION
Many of the dangers we face indeed arise from science and
technology—but, more fundamentally, because we have become
powerful without becoming commensurately wise. The world-altering
powers that technology has delivered into our hands now require a
degree of consideration and foresight that has never before been asked
of us. —Carl Sagan. 1

For the first time in human history, outer space is becoming
accessible, useful, and habitable. Unfortunately, the rapid development
of technology driving our access to space is outpacing the wisdom
necessary to use it responsibly. This Article is an effort to address urgent
ethical, political, and legal questions about humanity’s future in light of
developing space technologies. Without a dramatic change in course,
humanity may suffer a species-ending catastrophe this century.
Safeguarding humanity’s future will likely require leveraging helpful
space technologies and eventually becoming a multi-planetary species, 2
but the process of space development can create or escalate other
existential risks. Whether space is more likely to help us or hurt us
depends largely on our legal, regulatory, and policy regimes. 3
There is considerable disagreement about the goals of space
development, and these differing views give rise to various possible
configurations of law and regulation. 4 One approach emphasizes the
importance of space as a unique environment for conducting scientific
research. 5 From this perspective, space should be primarily governed by
a principle of non-exclusion, shared access, and environmental

CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT: A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE
179 (Ballantine Books 1997).
2
See generally ANNALEE NEWITZ, SCATTER, ADAPT, AND REMEMBER: HOW
HUMANS WILL SURVIVE A MASS EXTINCTION (2013) (discussing the strategy of
settling in space to mitigate existential risk); see also supra section IV(A)(4)
(discussing the merits of such a strategy).
3
See DUKE PROJECT ON GOING TO MARS, MARTIAN MIGRATION: POL’Y REP. ON
SCI., SOC’Y, & SUSTAINABILITY viii (Charles (Chase) Hamilton et al. eds., 2021)
(arguing in a similar spirit that the success of potential space settlements
depends on further inquiry into social, legal, and political questions).
4
See Alanna Krolikowski & Martin Elvis, Marking Policy for New Asteroid
Activities: In Pursuit of Science, Settlement, Security, or Sales?, 47 SPACE
POL’Y 7, 8 (2019) (arguing that the different possible uses of asteroid resources
are best served by policy regimes with distinct features).
5
See James S.J. Schwartz, Space settlement: What’s the Rush? 110 FUTURES 56,
58 (2019) (arguing for the primacy of scientific interests).
1
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preservation. 6 Another approach envisions extracting resources from
planets, moons, and asteroids to spur economic growth. 7 This view
emphasizes the role of competition and the need for exclusive property
rights to space resources. 8 While each of these approaches offer upsides,
they also expose humanity to a variety of unacceptable, catastrophic
risks, including in the near term. 9 While other goals may be tempting,
space policy should seek to avoid introducing or exacerbating existential
risks and, where possible, provide avenues for achieving existential
security. 10
Legal controversies must be analyzed with this policy goal in
mind. Motivated by the allure of commercial enterprise and geopolitical
advantage, the United States’ (US’s) approach to space law emphasizes
decentralization along three fronts: open access for commercial activity
by private actors, broadly-permitted military activities by states, and a
preference for national rather than international space governance. 11 By
contrast, many non-Western states (Russia, China, and the Global South)
typically support a more centralized, coordinated approach to space. 12
For example, under the 1979 Moon Treaty, space and its resources would
be considered the “common heritage of [hu]mankind,” 13 prohibiting
states and private actors from exploiting space resources until an
international regime lays ground rules for orderly management and
See Krolikowski & Elvis, supra note 4 (stating these principles follow when
scientific research is the fundamental goal).
7
See Matthew Weinzierl, Space, the Final Economic Frontier, 32 J. ECON.
PERSP. 173, 175 (2018) (providing a framework for market activities like
resource extraction to expand through decentralization).
8
Id. at 187; see also David Collins, Efficient Allocation of Real Property Rights
on the Planet Mars, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 201, 202 (2008) (arguing with a
neoliberal approach).
9
See infra Section IV.
10
See infra Section III. For the only other relatively comprehensive examination
of space and existential risk, see generally DANIEL DEUDNEY, DARK SKIES:
SPACE EXPANSIONISM, PLANETARY GEOPOLITICS, & THE ENDS OF HUMANITY
(2020) (arguing from a critical scholarship perspective that space development is
more likely to cause than prevent extinction).
11
See infra Section II.
12
Id.
13
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, art. XI, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “Moon
Treaty”]. No spacefaring nation has signed this treaty, rendering it largely
ineffectual. I choose to use “[hu]mankind” rather than the original, gendered
“mankind.” See generally Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelley- Chew, Subtly Sexist
Language, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 643 (2007) (describing research that
male-gendered language tends to trigger male-biased imagery in the minds of
readers, which has harmful effects over time).
6
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equitable sharing. 14 Military activities would be limited, and international
law would play a central, coordinating role. 15 While these two different
legal approaches have been subject to much scrutiny, little consideration
has been given from the standpoint of existential risk.
This Article contends that a decentralized approach to space law
increases the likelihood of an existential catastrophe. Existential risk
reduction is an intergenerational global public good that is predictably
undersupplied by individual actors. 16 International coordination is
necessary to align individual interests with humanity’s collective
wellbeing, for example by imposing costs that exceed the benefits of
activities that increase existential risk. 17 Space law does not impose such
costs. Instead, it is rife with externalities, including factors that
incentivize individual actors—private and governmental alike—to
exploit the benefits of space development without paying due regard to
the impact on humanity’s collective security. 18 A change of course is
needed.
Section II lays out the current space law regime, including
contentious disagreements about the degree of centralization it imposes.
Section III surveys existential risk literature to help articulate a
governing principle for space development. Section IV identifies ten
existential risk mechanisms impacted by the current space law regime.
Section V offers a path forward.

II. AN INCOMPLETE SPACE LAW REGIME
The corpus of international space law is contained within just
four treaties, the most important of which is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
(OST). 19 Ratified by 110 states, including every spacefaring nation, the
See Joanne I. Gabrynowicz, The "Province" and "Heritage" of Mankind
Reconsidered: A New Beginning, THE 2D CONF. ON LUNAR BASES & SPACE
ACTIVITIES . 21ST CENTURY 691, 691–92 (1992) (interpreting the common
heritage of humanity principle).
15
Id.
16
See infra Section III(B).
17
Id.
18
See infra Section IV.
19
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”].
The other three treaties are the 1968 Rescue Agreement (Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119),
the 1972 Liability Convention (Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S.
14
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OST was negotiated quickly during the height of the Cold War after the
launch of the Earth’s first artificial satellite. 20 The Soviet Union (USSR)
and the US wanted to avoid making space a costly theater of conflict and
drafted three particularly distinctive provisions to that end. 21 The
meaning of these provisions is subject to considerable disagreement.

A. Article II, Non-Appropriation, and Commercial Activities
Under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), outer space is the
“province of all [hu]mankind[;]” its exploration and use is mainly for
“scientific investigation” and must “be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development . . . .” 22 Moreover, Article II provides that space
and celestial bodies (planets, moons, asteroids, and so forth) are “not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means.” 23 Thus, space is widely
considered by international legal scholars to be a type of global
commons—a shared domain where access to non-rivalrous goods (like
scientific exploration) cannot legally be prevented by others and whose
rivalrous goods (like mineral resources) should not be snatched up by
individual countries for personal gain. 24 This structure was meant to
strike a balance between freedom of scientific investigation and
avoidance of a first-come, first-served land grab reminiscent of European
empires in previous centuries. 25
It has long been clear from the non-appropriation principle that
no state has the right to claim any celestial body as sovereign territory. In
recent years, however, controversy has arisen as to whether Article II
applies to the activities of private actors as well as nations, and whether
the non-appropriation of celestial bodies prohibits the extraction of space
resources for commercial purposes. The US now appears to believe that
the non-appropriation principle does prohibit the activities of private
187), and the 1975 Registration Convention (Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023
U.N.T.S. 15).
20
See Peter Jankowitsch, The Background and History of Space Law, in
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 4 –5 (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds.,
2015).
21
See id. at 3.
22
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19, at art. I.
23
Id. at art. II.
24
See Frans von der Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE
LAW, supra note 20, at 55–56.
25
Fabio Tronchetti, The Non-Appropriation Principle Under Attack: Using
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty in Its Defence, 50 PROC. L. OUTER SPACE
526, 530 (2007).
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actors who extract space resources for commercial purposes. In 2015
Congress passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act (CSLCA), recognizing under domestic law private property rights to
space resources acquired by American citizens: 26
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained,
including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with
applicable law, including the international obligations of the
United States. 27
The statute is followed by a disclaimer of extraterritorial
sovereignty: “It is the sense of Congress that by the enactment of this
Act, the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or
exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial
body.” 28 In April 2020, President Donald Trump signed an executive
order furthering the sentiment that “Americans should have the right to
engage in commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in
outer space” and, puzzlingly, declaring that “the United States does not
view [outer space] as a global commons.” 29
These bold claims came as a shock to the international
community. Scholars have denounced the CSLCA as a “detraction” from
international space law, partly because the records of negotiation of the
OST includes widespread recognition that Article II was meant broadly
to prohibit appropriation of all kinds. 30 For example, during negotiation
of the Treaty, Belgium expressed that it “had taken note of the
interpretation of the term ‘non-appropriation’ advanced by several
delegations—without contradiction—as covering both the establishment
of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law.” 31
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015) (codified in scattered sections of 51 U.S.C.).
27
Id. § 51303.
28
Id. § 403.
29
Executive Order on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and
Use of Space Resources, Sec. 2, Wʜɪᴛᴇ Hᴏᴜsᴇ (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-orderencouraging-international-support-recovery-use-space-resources/.
30
Stephan Hobe & Kuan-Wei Chen, Legal Status of Outer Space and Celestial
Bodies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 30 (Ram Jakhu & Paul
Dempsey, eds., 2017).
31
Virgiliu Pop, Appropriation in Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land
and Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 SPACE POL’Y 275,
276 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
26
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Similarly, France believed Article II reflected “the prohibition of any
claim of sovereignty or property rights in space . . . .” 32 The emphasis in
Article II on state-related forms of appropriation like sovereignty reflects
the assumption by everyone at the time that states would be the only
actors in space. 33 It was not until decades later that private space
activities became viable. 34
Under the traditional interpretation of Article II, individual
countries and their citizens have no right to exploit finite space resources
for commercial purposes. 35 The CLSCA lifts the condition of
excludability for its private actors, creating a common goods dilemma. 36
Acting individually, each state faces a choice: sit by and watch as other
states allow their citizens to profit from appropriating finite space
resources, or join in the race. Already, Luxembourg has followed the
United States’ reinterpretation, stating in a 2017 law that “[s]pace
resources can be appropriated” by private companies for commercial
purposes. 37 With the floodgates opening, more states are sure to follow.
The severity of this problem depends on the degree to which market
incentives pull in favor of practices with negative externalities. This
Article discusses this topic in Sections III(B) and IV.

B. Article IV, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Peaceful
Purposes
Article IV prohibits the placement of “weapons of mass
destruction” (WMDs) in orbit around the Earth or on celestial bodies,
and further provides that celestial bodies are to be used “exclusively for
peaceful purposes.” 38 It additionally provides that celestial bodies shall
Id.
See Abigail Pershing, Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty’s NonAppropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today, 44
YALE J. INT’L L. 149, 154–157 (noting supporting sources).
34
Id.
35
Tronchetti, supra note 25.
36
The well-known tragedy of the commons arises for rivalrous, non-excludable
goods. Economically rational actors fail to invest in future gains from common
goods, which may end up being taken by another. All are incentivized to snatch
up everything they can because they cannot exclude others from doing the same.
Overuse over time causes depletion of the resource to everybody’s disadvantage,
and yet competition among individuals incentivizes such mutually destructive
behavior. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243
(1968).
37
Luxembourg Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources, Article I,
Lᴇɢɪʟᴜx (2017), https://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo
(translated from French).
38
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19, at art. IV.
32
33
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not be used for “[t]he establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons[,] and the conduct of
military maneuvers . . . .” 39 These provisions played an important role in
preventing an arms race from spreading to celestial bodies and avoiding
the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth. 40 Still, the
ambition of peaceful purposes stands in tension with the prolific military
space activities that occur today. 41
There is disagreement about the ambit of “exclusively peaceful
purposes” on celestial bodies. 42 In the early years, the USSR interpreted
“peaceful” to mean “non-military,” which would have broadly prohibited
the use of celestial bodies for any military goals. 43 In contrast, the US
interpreted “peaceful” as “non-aggressive,” which permitted any military
activities otherwise allowed by international law 44—essentially, anything
except the other limitations listed in Article IV, as well as provisions
from the UN Charter prohibiting the use or threat of force. 45 By the time
the OST was ratified, the US’s interpretation had won out, and the USSR
withdrew its objections. 46
In a similar resistance to anti-military space doctrine, the US has
repeatedly objected to efforts to develop new space arms control
measures. Most states believe at least one of two changes are necessary:
a comprehensive treaty aimed at the deweaponization of space, or at
minimum, an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon ban treaty. The issue of
deweaponization is helpfully elucidated by pointing to a difference
between militarization and weaponization in space contexts.
“Militarization” refers to the use of space systems for terrestrial military
activities, such as through reconnaissance, the Global Positioning
System, and weather monitoring satellites. “Weaponization,” on the
other hand, refers to the deployment of offensive weapons in space or on
the ground with their intended target located in space. Deweaponization
efforts therefore seek to prohibit the testing, deployment, or use of such
weapons.

Id.
Setsuko Aoki, Law and Military Uses of Outer Space, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 30, at 197.
41
Id.
42
Fabio Tronchetti, Legal aspects of the military uses of outer space, in
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 20, at 331.
43
Aoki, supra note 40, at 200.
44
Id. at 199.
45
Tronchetti, supra note 42, at 339–40.
46
Aoki, supra note 40, at 200.
39
40
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Most of the world has long supported the deweaponization of
space. In particular, Russia and China have offered six proposals
between them since 1982, 48 the latest of which from 2014 revolves
around prohibitions on the placement of weapons in outer space and on
the use or threat of force against outer space objects. 49 Despite these
efforts, each proposal has been unequivocally shot down by the US. 50
The US asserts two concerns: first, that the scope of the prohibitions is
underinclusive; second, that each proposed treaty lacks adequate
verification measures. 51 The US nominally would prefer a treaty to go
beyond prohibiting the threat or use of force against outer space objects
so that it also explicitly includes the research, development, testing,
production, storage, and deployment of terrestrially-based ASATs. 52
Their concern is that a party could build and have in its inventory a
readily deployable ASAT. 53 The US points to continued ASAT
development efforts by Russia and China as evidence that the latest draft
treaty is designed to uniquely advantage countries who have already
invested in terrestrial ASAT technology. 54
47

The American position is undermined by the fact that Russian
and Chinese ASAT development may be motivated partly by the US’s
repeated efforts to stonewall arms control agreements. The US also
rejects the good in favor of the perfect, refusing to sign onto two arms
control measures that would be at least marginal improvements just
because they might not apply to some aspects of terrestrial-based weapon
development. Russia and China have emphasized that deweaponization
is a gradual process, and that these two measures would be among the
most effective and feasible ways of preventing armed conflict in outer
Tronchetti, supra note 42, at 334.
See Aoki, supra note 40, at 210 (listing proposals made in the Conference on
Disarmament).
49
Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,
the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, Feb. 12, 2008; see
NTI, PAROS Treaty, https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-andregimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/ (last visited May
31, 2022) (describing developments in the treaties).
50
See Aoki, supra note 40, at 210–12 (noting the US’s objections to each).
51
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT, ANALYSIS OF THE 2014 RUSSIAN-CHINESE DRAFT “TREATY ON
THE PREVENTION OF THE PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE, THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST OUTER SPACE OBJECTS” (PPWT) (CD/1985) 1, 2
(2014) [hereinafter US Comments],
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/CD/1998.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
47
48
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space. 55 In any case, the US has not yet formally offered any solutions of
its own. 56
The US criticizes the draft treaty for lacking verification
measures and objects to signing a treaty whose verification measures
would only be determined through subsequent negotiation. 57 Russia and
China contend in reply that it is precisely following the implementation
of the treaty that verification mechanisms will become worth discussing
in light of experience. 58 They also point out that the US frequently signs
arm control treaties without formal verification mechanisms, including
the OST. 59 The deadlock is driven no doubt in part by the long history of
competition and distrust between these nations. 60
Another major issue in the arms control context is the presence
of dual-use technology that can be used for either military or civil
purposes. 61 For example, devices that can be used to help remove space
debris can also be used to tamper with or destroy active satellites. 62 A
similar issue concerns the definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDs), which the OST prohibits from being placed in orbit around the
Earth and on celestial bodies. 63 At the time of drafting, WMDs were
Permanent Rep. of China to the Conference on Disarmament & the Charge
d’affaires a.i. of the Russian Federation, Letter dated 11 September 2015 from
the Permanent Rep. of China to the Conference on Disarmament and the Charge
d’affairs a.i. of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Conference Transmitting Comments by China and the Russian Federation
Regarding the United States of America Analysis of the 2014 Updated Russian
and Chinese Texts of the Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space
Objects (PPWT), ¶ 3, U.N. DOC. CD/2042 (Sep. 13, 2015) [hereinafter China &
Russia Comments], https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/CD/2042 (2015).
56
See Aoki, supra note 40, at 210 (listing Conference on Disarmament
proposals).
57
US Comments, supra note 51, ¶ 1(a).
58
China & Russia Comments, supra note 55, ¶ 24.
59
Id. at ¶¶ 20–21.
60
See, e.g., Christine Huang et al., China’s Partnership With Russia Seen as
Serious Problem for the U.S., Pew Research (Apr. 22, 2022),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/04/28/chinas-partnership-with-russiaseen-as-serious-problem-for-the-us/ (describing research on American views of
relations between Russia, China, and the US).
61
Tronchetti, supra note 42, at 332.
62
James Alver et al., An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris
Removal, On-Orbit Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations
Technologies (May 6, 2019) (Master’s Thesis, The George Washington
University),
https://swfound.org/media/206800/misuse_commercial_adr_oos_jul2019.pdf.
63
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19, at art. IV.
55
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defined “to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material
weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons
developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in
destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons
mentioned above.” 64 Today, there is concern that any large object could
be a WMD if crashed into the Earth from orbit—a type of warfare called
kinetic bombardment. 65
Finally, Article IV of the OST deals only with activities on
celestial bodies and in orbit around the Earth. 66 Crucially, these
provisions do not seem to apply to activities in the empty space between
celestial bodies—the void of outer space—which constitutes the vast
majority of the universe. 67
These ambiguities, combined with the rising importance of space
to commercial and military actors alike, point to the need for further
legal development. A comprehensive regime change to govern all aspects
of the military uses of outer space, rather than the OST’s piecemeal
approach, may be necessary. 68 Unfortunately, the history of space policy
shows that a lack of trust and transparency between countries hinders
negotiations.

C. Article VI, State Supervision, and Flags of Convenience
International space law relies heavily on nations to decide upon
and enforce their own national space laws. Article VI of the OST
provides that states must “authoriz[e] and continu[ously] supervis[e]” all
“national activities in outer space[,]” including those by nongovernmental actors. 69 States therefore “bear international responsibility”
for ensuring that private actors respect international law when
conducting space activities. 70 As a further incentive for adopting
effective national space laws, Article VII makes states internationally
Commission for Conventional Armaments, Resolutions Adopted by the
Commission at its 13th Meeting, 12 August 1948, and a 2nd Progress Report of
the Commission, U.N. DOC. S/C.3/32/Rev.1, at 2 (Aug. 18, 1948),
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/755665?ln=fr.
65
US Project Thor Would Fire Tungsten Poles at Targets From Outer Space,
SPACE DAILY (Nov. 12, 2018),
spacedaily.com/reports/US_Project_Thor_would_fire_tungsten_poles_at_targets
_from_outer_space_999.html.
66
Tronchetti, supra note 42, at 338.
67
Id.
68
See Tronchetti, supra note 42, at 332 (“[A] coherent and comprehensive legal
framework governing military activities in outer space is currently missing.”).
69
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19, at art. VI.
70
Id.
64
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liable for damages caused by any actors who have launched space
objects from within their borders. 71 The OST therefore relies on states to
adopt national laws that regulate the behaviors of its space activities.
The hope may have been that, by allowing states to set and
enforce their own standards, countries would work out the best practices
over time amongst themselves. 72 The drafters of the OST, however,
presumed that all space activity would be conducted directly by states,
just as it had been during the Cold War. 73 They did not foresee the
importance and influence private markets would come to have on space
practices. 74 As the cost of space access diminishes and the value of space
activities rises, humanity will likely witness a dangerous race to the
bottom in national approaches to space law. 75
Consider license shopping in the maritime context. For centuries,
ships simply flew the flag of the ship owner’s home country. 76 The flag
state has jurisdiction over the ship and is responsible for inspecting for
safety and the crew’s working conditions. 77 Starting in the 1920s during
the Prohibition, many American ship owners began to register their ships
not with the US but with Panama in order to legally serve alcohol to their
passengers. 78 Even after the Prohibition, ship owners realized that,
compared to the US, Panama provided a tax refuge, weaker labor laws,
and lax oversight. 79 Thus emerged so-called “flags of convenience,”
licenses from states that ship owners may have no connection to but that
offer favorable regulatory practices. 80 Unfortunately, with less oversight
came lower operating standards. 81 Ships flying flags of convenience
became known for having unsafe and unethical working conditions and,
tragically, have been responsible for some of the highest-profile oil spills
in history. 82 Further, even where a flag state has sufficient regulations on
the books, it is often unable or unwilling to enforce them, making it a
Id. at art. VII.
Hobe & Chen, supra note 30, at 38.
73
Pershing, supra note 33.
74
Id.
75
Frans G. von der Dunk, Towards ‘Flags of Convenience’ in Space?, SPACE,
CYBER, & TELECOMM. L. PROGRAM FAC. PUBLICATIONS 76, at 1 (2012).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, FLAGGING STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND LABOR REGULATIONS AT SEA 76 (2006).
79
Id.
80
See id. at 3 (noting that States compete for ship registrations by keeping
regulations minimal or lightly enforced and shipowners register in those States).
81
Id.
82
See id. at 1 (giving an example of one large oil spill).
71
72
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haven for arms smuggling and human trafficking. 83 In an effort to
combat these lapses, the law of the high seas evolved to require a
“genuine link” between the ship and the flag country. 84 The “genuine
link” requirement is, however, notoriously weak. 85 Today more than 40%
of the world’s cargo is carried by ships registered with Panama, Liberia,
and the Marshall Islands—collectively making up only 0.1% of the
world’s population 86—despite the fact that most ships have never visited
those places. 87
Flags of convenience may be the future of private space activity
given the current legal regime. 88 Like in the maritime context, space
businesses are free to license shop between countries based on regulatory
schemes and practices, and—unlike in maritime law—there is not even a
weak “genuine link” requirement. 89 Instead, liability and responsibility
for private actors falls to the “launching State[,]” defined simply as “(i)
[a] State which launches or procures the launching of a space object[,
and] (ii) [a] State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched[.]” 90 Because international space law does not directly impose
safety standards, best practices, or compliance and verification
mechanisms, these are left entirely up to the flag state. 91 As more private
space operators emerge and the value of their businesses skyrocket,
countries will likely realize that they can make their flags more attractive
by imposing lower regulatory standards or enforcing them less
stringently. Launchers may look for states that allow them to launch
without rigorous safety inspections; operators could even more simply
move the terrestrial headquarters of their existing space-based activities
to states that will not seriously supervise them. As competition drives

Human Rights Watch, Statement to the United Nations Open-Ended Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (June 2, 2003),
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/contributions2004/HRW2004.p
df.
84
von der Dunk, supra note 75, at 2.
85
Id. at 2–3.
86
These three states combined have only 9 million of the world’s 7.8 billion
people.
87
Why So Many Shipowners Find Panama's Flag Convenient, BBC (Aug. 5,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28558480 (noting that
“almost three quarters of the world’s fleet was registered under a flag of a
country other than its own”).
88
von der Dunk, supra note 75, at 2.
89
Id.
90
1975 Registration Convention, art. I; 1972 Liability Convention, art. I; which
both use language drawing from the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19, art. VII.
91
von der Dunk, supra note 75, at 4.
83
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standards and supervision lower, the risks rise. 92 Even if most countries
exercise stringent and effective oversight, it takes only one defector
willing to accept higher risks before we witness a harbor under which
dangerous space practices could proliferate. 93
The US has long opposed the development of any new
international legal instruments that would limit its access to or use of
outer space. 94 In its refusal to make any concessions, the US may be
opening a Pandora’s box.

III. UNDERSTANDING AND PRIORITIZING EXISTENTIAL RISK
The question of space development is unlike most other
questions of policy—it is extraordinarily big, concerning the future of
our entire species. As a matter of procedure, it makes sense to break from
traditional approaches to risk analysis that start by focusing on marginal
and local considerations and only at the end look towards the broader
stakes, if considering them at all. For example, when considering local
pollutant regulations, the likelihood that our competing policy options
will bear significantly on the survival of humanity is so small and hard to
predict that it is generally not worth the time or resources to try.
Decisions made about space, on the other hand, stand to change the
course of humanity’s development and could be felt for centuries. In this
Section, I survey the body of existential risk literature to better
understand existential risk and why its mitigation should be the
governing principle of space development.

A. The Expected Value of Existential Risk Mitigation
Existential risks are those risks to humans that are species-wide
in scope and terminal in magnitude. 95 In other words, a quintessential
existential risk is one that threatens the permanent end of the human
species—a disaster from which humanity’s recovery is impossible and
survival is unendurable. 96 Also, there are some risks that scholars
consider to be existential that would not entail the “bang” of a sudden
life-ending disaster—there are also “crunches” (permanent stagnation in
Id. at 13–16.
Id. See also supra note 139 and accompanying discussion of the
Unilateralist’s Curse.
94
See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY 2 (2006) (“The
United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.”).
95
See Nick Bostrom, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios
and Related Hazards, 9 J. EVOLUTION & TECH. 1, 2 (2002) (defining existential
risks).
96
Id.
92
93
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human development, such as through a disaster that leaves humanity
alive but unable to ever technologically recover), “shrieks” (development
into an undesirable and irrevocable condition, such as permanent
takeover by a repressive totalitarian global regime), and “whimpers”
(gradual and irrevocable disappearance of value, such as through a
squandering of finite resources). 97 What all of these scenarios have in
common is the permanent and drastic curtailment of humanity’s longterm potential. 98 However, for demonstrative purposes, I will largely
focus for now on catastrophes that could bring about human extinction
(the “bangs”).
Almost everybody agrees extinction would be bad, 99 but it is
difficult to comprehend just how bad. Still, in order to incorporate
existential risks into policymaking considerations, it is important to
speak in terms of expected value, which requires us to estimate the
badness of extinction. 100
For one, a sudden existential catastrophe would entail the death
of all living people. In quantitative terms, this would be worse than any
tragedy humanity has ever experienced, surpassing the number of deaths
accrued from the Holocaust seven hundred times over. 101 Nevertheless,
attempting to imagine catastrophe on such a mass scale does not
typically motivate us to the same degree as a tragic accident involving
the death of even a single child. 102 This is a classic case of scope
Id. at 5.
Id.
99
See Nick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority, 4 GLOBAL
POL. 15, 23–24 (2013) (noting the convergence of ethical theories on the
badness of extinction).
100
A decision’s expected value—the standard metric for determining an agent’s
optimal choice—is the probability-weighted sum of its possible outcomes’
values. JORDAN SOBEL, TAKING CHANCES: ESSAYS ON RATIONAL CHOICE ix
(1995). Estimating the badness of extinction is therefore crucial for comparing
the expected value of existential risk reduction against other, lower-magnitude–
higher-probability options.
101
The Holocaust is estimated to have killed eleven million people. If the world
contains 7.8 billion people at the time of extinction, as it does now, that would
entail deaths amounting to 709.09 Holocausts. See also Bostrom, supra note 99,
at 18 (noting that on a graph representing total world population over time,
“[c]alamities such as the Spanish flu pandemic, the two world wars, and the
Holocaust scarcely register”).
102
See Eliezer Yudkowski, Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of
Global Risks , in GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS 114 (Nick Bostrom & Milan M.
Ćirokvić eds., 2008) (“People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of
an existential risk, and say, ‘Well, maybe the human species doesn’t really
deserve to survive’.”).
97
98
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insensitivity, our psychological inability to “feel” the badness of
outcomes as scaling up with the number of deaths involved. 103 In fact,
psychological research demonstrates “mass numbing”—a person’s
willingness to pay to save other people from some risk actually tends to
decrease as the number of people at risk grows beyond ten or so. 104
Rationally, however, each person’s death would represent a great loss
and ought to be avoided. This is one way existential risks involve stakes
much higher than most other traditional policy concerns.
The badness of extinction would not end at losses felt in the
present, but would be severely exacerbated by the loss of a future for
humanity. This additional loss would be even worse than an utterly
devastating catastrophe, such as the mass death of billions. 105 This is
because the ultimate potential of life on Earth is incomprehensibly high.
The most conservative estimates predict that, absent extinction in the
next one billion years, the Earth can support 1016 human lives of presentday length. 106 The scale of that number leads to a shocking result:
assuming, as almost all ethicists do, that future lives are about as morally
valuable as today’s lives, 107 “the expected value of reducing existential
Id. (applying cognitive research to existential risks); see also Chase
Hamilton, Modernizing Conservationism: Renewable Energy’s SpeciesPreserving Effect and the Endangered Species Act, 41 DUKE ENVIRON. L. &
POL. F. 379, 410–11 (2021) (summarizing mental heuristics involving tradeoffs
between individuals and groups in both human and nonhuman contexts).
104
See Paul Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”: Psychic Numbing
and Genocide, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 79 (2007); Paul Slovic et al.,
Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity, in BEHAV. FOUNDS. POL’Y 126 (Eldar
Shafir ed., 2013) (finding that people are most willing to pay to save groups of
around ten people, but that they become less willing to pay to save larger groups
of people than they are willing to pay to save one or two individuals). For a
discussion of mass numbing as applied to existential risks, see Jonathan Wiener,
The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of the Apocalypse, 7 GLOBAL
POL’Y 67, 72–73 (2016).
105
See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 453–54 (1984) (arguing that the
moral difference between peace and a war that kills 99% of the world’s
population is actually much smaller than the difference between a war that kills
99% and a war that kills 100% of the world’s population).
106
Bostrom, supra note 99, 18–19. To be conservative, Bostrom assumes these
lives will last 100 years on average. These lives will probably end up being
much longer and much better than today’s lives with the advancement of
technologies. See generally OLLE HÄGGSTRÖM, HERE BE DRAGONS: SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY (2016) (exploring humanity’s
long-term potential).
107
Moral philosophers widely agree that future lives are about as valuable as
present ones. After all, for most of human history, we were future lives, and we
generally take our lives to be worth living. See, e.g., PARFIT, supra note 105, at 425
103
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risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point [0.00000001%] is at
least a hundred times the value of a million human lives.” 108 In other
words, even marginal reductions in existential risk tend to swamp other
policy interests. These numbers become even more gargantuan if one
assumes that humanity will develop advanced technologies and
eventually expand into space. 109
There are other, nonquantitative reasons that the loss of
humanity’s future would be uniquely bad. 110 One is an argument from
normative uncertainty: there is no consensus regarding what outcomes
would count as a big win for humanity. 111 Humanity should therefore
preserve its ability to recognize value and steer the future accordingly,
which will not be possible if humankind no longer exists. 112 Another
argument looks not to the future, but the past: each generation has a
(“[In general,] we ought to be equally concerned about the predictable effects of our
acts whether these will occur in one, or a hundred, or a thousand years.”); John
Nolt, Nonanthropocentric climate ethics, 2 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 701, 703
(“[M]any intergenerational ethicists view the discounting of harms and benefits to
future people as unjustifiable discrimination.”); ORD, infra note 114, at 413 (noting
that the overwhelming majority of philosophers reject a pure time preference on
valuing human lives).
108
Bostrom, supra note 99, 18–19 (emphasis in original).
109
Id. at 19 (“The more technologically comprehensive estimate [incorporating
space settlements and mind digitization] of 1054 human-brain-emulation
subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even
more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative
output potential of a technologically mature civilisation a mere 1 per cent chance
of being correct, we ﬁnd that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a
mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred
billion times as much as a billion human lives.”).
110
Non-quantitative considerations may still have a place in weighing the
expected value of risk mitigation, either in affecting one’s consideration of the
magnitude of an outcome’s value or in altering the way one approaches the risk
non-consequentially. See generally Carl Cranor, Toward a Non-Consequentialist
Approach to Acceptable Risks, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 36 (Tim
Lewens ed., 2007).
111
See generally DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS (2011) (arguing that ethics
is a young field in which great progress can still be made); see also Ross
Anderson, We’re Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/wereunderestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/ (interviewing Nick
Bostrom) (“[O]ur human experience might be just a small little crumb of what’s
possible. . . . [I]t might be that human nature constrains us to a very narrow little
corner of the space of possible modes of being. . . . [H]umanity in its current
stage might be like a little cowering infant sitting in the corner of [a grand]
cathedral having only the most limited sense of what is possible.”).
112
Bostrom, supra note 99, 24–26.
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custodial responsibility to continue the human project left to us by our
ancestors. 113 These arguments help demonstrate that the stakes involved
in existential contexts are unique and significant.
For the majority of people who do not take existential threats
seriously, it is not because they seriously doubt the stakes, but because
they do not believe that such events have a realistic chance of actually
occurring. 114 Given that the potential losses from existential risks are so
high, one would hope that their probabilities are low enough—far, far
below 1%—to bring their expected values into a range that is reasonably
comparable to other risks. That unfortunately does not seem to be the
case. Startlingly, surveyed experts predict the likelihood of extinction by
2100 to be between about 10% and 25%. 115 These figures are about
one million times higher than what people normally think 116 and may
still be conservative. 117 If these estimations are even close to being
correct, existential risk mitigation should be of the utmost priority
wherever even minor gains in existential security can be confidently
made.

Id. at 23 (noting the possibility of “custodial duties to preserve the
inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to
our descendants”).
114
TOBY ORD, THE PRECIPICE 40–41 (2020).
115
See ANDERS SANDBERG & NICK BOSTROM, FUTURE HUMAN. INST., GLOBAL
CATASTROPHIC RISKS SURVEY, TECHNICAL REPORT 2008/1 (2008) (finding that
surveyed experts offered a median anthropogenic risk of extinction by 2100 of
19%). Another report predicts a 9.5% chance of catastrophic chance this
century. GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUND., GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS ANNUAL
REPORT 24 (2016). Nick Bostrom, the leading expert in this field, has said “[m]y
subjective opinion is that setting this probability lower than 25% would be
misguided, and the best estimate may be considerably higher.” Bostrom, supra
note 95, at 19. Toby Ord, another highly-qualified expert, gives existential
catastrophe a one in six chance (16.6%) of occurring this century. ORD, supra
note 114, at 169.
116
Benjamin Todd, The Case for Reducing Existential Risks, 80,000 HOURS,
https://80000hours.org/articles/existential-risks/ (published Oct., 2017).
117
Sir Martin Rees, Britain’s Astronomer Royal, gives humanity no more than
50-50 odds on surviving this century. MARTIN REES, OUR FINAL HOUR: A
SCIENTIST’S WARNING 8 (2003). John von Neumann, as Chairman of the U.S.
Air Force Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, stated after World War II
that it was “absolutely certain (1) that there would be a nuclear war; and (2) that
everyone would die in it.” JOHN LESLIE, THE END OF THE WORLD: THE SCIENCE
AND ETHICS OF HUMAN EXTINCTION 26 (1996). According to some plausible
arguments, the odds of extinction may in fact be nearly 100%. See infra, notes
120–122 (describing the Fermi Paradox, Doomsday Argument, and Simulation
Argument).
113
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There are indirect and direct approaches for estimating the
probability of existential risks. Indirect methods analyze general features
of the world in which we live to identify the risk of extinction occurring.
Some indirect risk estimation methods should cause one to reconsider
their confidence that the odds of extinction are low, such as the influence
of psychological biases 118 and the inherent error-proneness of lowprobability risk assessments. 119 Even more worrying are the indirect
methods that predict a very high probability of extinction, including the
Fermi Paradox, 120 the Doomsday Argument, 121 and the Simulation
See Yudkowski, supra note 102, at 92 (discussing psychological factors that
cause us to underestimate the probability of existential risks).
119
The uncertainty and error-proneness of our first-order assessments of risk
often dominates in low-probability, high-consequence contexts. Bostrom, supra
note 99, at 16 (“Suppose that some scientific analysis A indicates that some
catastrophe X has an extremely small probability P(X) of occurring. Then the
probability that A has some hidden crucial flaw may easily be much greater than
P(X). Furthermore, the conditional probability of X given that A is crucially
flawed, P(X |¬A), may be fairly high. We may then find that most of the risk of
X resides in the uncertainty of our scientific assessment that P(X) was small[.]”).
120
There are many trillions of Earth-like planets in the observable universe, each
of which has some non-zero chance of developing life. Given the size and age of
the universe, if even one species survived and evolved to be intelligent and
spacefaring, the universe should be teeming with signs of their existence. But
there are no signs of life—no spaceships, no signals, no superstructures built
around stars. Thus, there must be (at least) one Great Filter—an evolutionary
step that is extremely improbable—whose occurrence is necessary for an Earthlike planet to produce detectable life. The key question for us is whether a Great
Filter is in our past (perhaps the development of eukaryotic life) or in our future
(perhaps the safe development of nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, or
norms against conflict), or both. If a Great Filter is in our future, the odds are
extraordinarily high that we will end up like every other civilization before us—
extinct before we spread throughout space enough to leave a footprint detectable
to civilizations like ours. Nick Bostrom, Where Are They? Why I Hope the
Search for Extraterrestrial Life Finds Nothing, MIT TECH. REV., May–June
2008, at 72.
121
This controversial argument relies on the observer selection effect, otherwise
known as anthropic reasoning. Imagine two urns containing sequentially
numbered balls. You know that one has ten balls and the other has one million
balls, but you do not know which is which. Imagine that you reach into one urn
and pull out a ball labeled “#7.” This would be a very strong indication that you
had reached into the urn containing just ten balls. Similarly, imagine two
possibilities, one where there will be 1011 humans, another with 1018 humans.
You do not know which you are in, but you do, in fact, know you are #60 billion
(just under 1011). This may be a strong indication (with a probability of around
99.9999%) the world you are in is the first one and will soon go extinct. LESLIE,
supra note 117, at 187.
118
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Argument. 122 If one or more of these arguments are sound, we will
almost certainly go extinct relatively soon. Unfortunately, we cannot
presently confirm that even one of these arguments fails. 123
While indirect methods of estimating existential risk give us
reasons to prioritize making existential risk a focal point in our policy
considerations, they have limited usefulness in helping identify and
address the direct causes of a potential extinction-level event. Direct
methods of risk assessment, on the other hand, look to specific potential
existential risks as well as their range of causes and in doing so help
reveal potential paths toward their prevention. The next subsection
considers existential risk from the direct perspective.

B. Sources of Existential Risk
Existential risks can be divided into two broad categories:
natural and anthropogenic. Potential extinction mechanisms with natural
origins include asteroid impacts or supervolcanic eruptions. While these
may be the existential risks discussed most frequently in news and
fiction, natural existential catastrophes are known to occur infrequently
because humanity and its precursors have survived for millions of years
in the face of such threats. 124 The baseline likelihood of one occurring in
the next hundred years is therefore very small—probably no more than 1

A technologically mature posthuman civilization would have enormous
computing power capable of running simulations whose subjects are conscious.
Therefore at least one of the following is true: (1) the fraction of civilizations
like ours that reach a posthuman stage is very close to zero (that is, we will go
extinct); (2) the fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running
conscious simulations (e.g. of their ancestors—people like us) is very close to
zero; (3) very nearly all people with our kind of experiences are living in a
simulation. If you, like many people, believe that we are not living in a
computer simulation, then you are not entitled to believe that we will have
descendants who will run lots of such simulations. Because we cannot know
whether our descendants will want to run such simulations, you ought to
considerably increase your credence in the belief that we will go extinct before
producing such descendants. Nick Bostrom, Are You Living in A Computer
Simulation? 53 PHIL. Q. 211, 243 (2003).
123
The literature on these topics is still evolving. Part of the problem is that this
scholarship is young and somewhat neglected. This suggests that there also may
be (potentially many) crucial arguments we have not yet considered.
124
The exact length of time depends on one’s definition of “humanity.” Early
Homo species emerged about 2.5 million years ago, with Homo erectus, the first
species to develop control of fire, emerging about 1.9 million years ago. Today’s
Homo sapiens emerged about 300,000 years ago. By contrast, humanity has
survived fewer than eighty years with nuclear weapon capabilities.
122
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in 10,000. 125 By contrast, with the advent of new technologies, our
species is now creating entirely new kinds of risks—threats that we have
no track record of surviving. For these anthropogenic risks, we cannot
rely on our long history of survival as grounds for optimism. The odds of
a human-caused existential catastrophe are probably at least 1,000 times
higher than a natural existential event. 126 In fact, much of that risk may
come from technologies intended to protect against natural risks but
which introduce more danger than they prevent. 127
Some risks are from mechanisms that could themselves directly
cause extinction. These include present threats—nuclear war, reaching a
point of no return for runaway climate change, and environmental
depletion—as well as future threats, like manufactured biological agents,
unaligned artificial intelligence, self-replicating nanotechnology,
unexpected disaster from large-scale physics experiments, and
geoengineering-caused adverse climate change. 128

ORD, supra note 114, at 167.
Id.
127
See, e.g., infra, Section IV(A)(1) (discussing asteroid deflection technology).
128
See generally Bostrom, supra note 95 (listing potential extinction
mechanisms).
125
126
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Estimated probability of human
extinction within 100 years

Asteroid or comet impact

~ 1 in 1,000,000

Supervolcanic eruption

~ 1 in 10,000

Stellar explosion

~ 1 in 1,000,000,000

Total natural risk

~ 1 in 10,000 (.01%)

Nuclear war

~ 1 in 1,000

Climate change

~ 1 in 1,000

Other environmental damage

~ 1 in 1,000

“Naturally” arising pandemics

~ 1 in 10,000

Engineered pandemics

~ 1 in 30

Unaligned artificial intelligence

~ 1 in 10

Unforeseen anthropogenic risks

~ 1 in 30

Other anthropogenic risks

~ 1 in 50

Total anthropogenic risks

~ 1 in 6 (16.67%)

Total existential risk

~ 1 in 6 (16.67%)

Table 1. Source: ORD, supra note 114, at 167. While these numbers are not
meant to be precise, they capture an expert’s sense of the orders of magnitude
involved for each risk. Note that very nearly all of the total risk is
anthropogenic.

Existential risk is not determined just directly by technological
threats, but also indirectly by social and legal regimes that help or hinder
cooperation, altruism, and research. Of particular note is the fact that
existential risk suffers from a massive collective action problem. 129
Reductions in existential risks are global public goods and are
predictably undersupplied by private and public actors alike. 130 Each
producer of existential safety—even a large nation—can capture only a
129
130

Bostrom, supra note 99, at 26.
Id.
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small portion of the benefits; therefore, they are unlikely to respond to
existential threats with vigor that reflects the social value of risk
reduction. 131 Worse still, most of the beneficiaries of risk prevention are
people who do not currently exist, multiplying the severity of the market
failure. 132 Future people would be willing to pay the present generation
enormous amounts of money or resources in return for even slight
reductions of existential risk, but the mutually beneﬁcial trade is
hindered by the obvious fact that future people do not have a voice with
which to negotiate. 133
The collective action problem is particularly problematic
because most existential risks demand international solutions. 134 Many
risks cannot be substantially reduced by actions that are internal to one
country. 135 For example, the scope of climate change is too large for one
country to solve on its own. 136 In fact, some risks are only absolved with
total global conformity. 137 For example, even if most countries closely
regulate the creation of a dangerous nanotechnology, it takes only one
country—or one actor within a country—that dissents or underestimates
the risks to threaten the world. 138 This is called the Unilateralist’s
Curse 139 and it is especially problematic in the space context given the
issue of flags of convenience. 140 Robust international coordination, and,
in some cases, ceding decision-making authority to the larger group, is
necessary to address these types of problems. 141

Id. For example, a country may choose to mitigate existential risk only in
proportion to their population, leaving other countries to make the same choice.
But not all countries may do the same—some may freeride on the investments
of others, knowing that it is in the other countries’ interests to pick up their
slack. The result is that countries tend to produce far less than their fair share of
existential security.
132
Id. at 27.
133
Id. Accordingly, one of the clearest ways to reduce existential risk is to give
future people greater representation in governance and decision-making. See
infra Section V.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Nick Bostrom et al., The Unilateralist’s Curse and the Case for the Principle
of Conformity, 30 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 350, 351 (2016); Nick Bostrom, The
Vulnerable World Hypothesis, 10 GLOBAL POL. 455, 462–70 (2019).
138
Bostrom, supra note 137.
139
Bostrom et al., supra note 137.
140
See supra Section II(C).
141
Bostrom et al., supra note 137, at 360.
131
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Consider that human history is full of luck. 142 For example,
scientists in the early 1940s worried that the first nuclear test, which
would momentarily produce temperatures rivaling the sun and never
before experienced on Earth, might cause a chain nuclear reaction and
ignite the Earth’s atmosphere and oceans. 143 They proceeded with the
test anyways, and we are lucky in the sense that their worries did not pan
out due to principles of physics we now better understand. 144 Luck may,
however, someday run out. Humanity continues to uncover novel risks,
so we should be cautious and unified as a species moving forward. 145 If
scientists in the 1920s had been asked to compile a list of existential
threats that would face humanity over the following hundred years, they
would have completely missed most of the risks that concern us today. 146
We too are likely ignorant of risks that could turn out to be extremely
pressing. In any case, the odds are unfortunately stacked against us:
because an existential event only has to happen once to destroy
humanity, repeated rolls of the dice stack up quickly. A quick
mathematical check reveals that for the odds of extinction to surpass
99% over the next 100 years, the odds of an existential event occurring in
any given year need only be 4.5%. 147 We have not yet survived eighty
years with technologies capable of causing an existential catastrophe, 148
and each year is more dangerous than the last. 149 It is crucial, then, to
consider how we might achieve existential security.

C. Achieving Existential Security
Because the vast majority of existential risk is anthropogenic, it
is our own choices that will have the greatest impact on our odds of
See, e.g., List of Nuclear Close Calls, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_close_calls (last accessed Feb. 4,
2022).
143
Bostrom, supra note 137, at 461
144
Id. In 1954, the US carried out another nuclear test, which ended up
exploding with a yield of 15 megatons rather than the planned 6 due to an
unforeseen physics reaction. We are lucky in the sense that scientists were only
wrong about the outcome of this test rather than the first one. Id.
145
Id. at 457–58.
146
See ORD supra note 114, at 162 (citing a 1937 governmental report on future
technology that did not foresee nuclear energy, antibiotics, jet aircraft,
transistors, computers, computers, or anything regarding space).
147
The formula for the probability “p” of an event occurring at least once over
some period of time “t” is 1-(1-p)^t. Where t=100, p need only equal 4.501% for
the result to exceed 99%.
148
The 1945 Trinity nuclear test marked the first time a technology was
deployed that had an appreciable subjective likelihood of causing an existential
catastrophe. ORD, supra note 114, at 92.
149
Bostrom, supra note 137.
142
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survival. 150 Therefore, we must be deliberate about our policymaking.
We cannot rely just on our intuitions, social attitudes, and existing
policies, which are all calibrated for dealing with risks we have already
encountered. 151 For example, we cannot sit back and rely on the
traditional method of trial-and-error. 152 There will be no opportunity to
learn from and adapt to an error that destroys us. 153 Similarly, purely ex
post forms of punishment (liability, criminal or trade sanctions, or threats
of military reprisal) are in this context insufficient deterrents for risky
behavior; for, in the event of an existential catastrophe, there would be
no opportunity to actualize the punishment. 154 Rather than being reactive,
we must be proactive, use foresight to anticipate new types of threats,
and be willing to take decisive preventive actions before a catastrophe
occurs. 155
Existential risk expert Toby Ord proposes a strategic plan for
humanity that would prioritize reaching existential security before
engaging in a long period of reflection about what matters most, and only
then focusing on actualizing our fullest potential. 156 Reaching existential
security requires making it an explicit, persistent priority to do away with
sources of existential risk that threaten to prematurely end humanity’s
projects. 157 In particular, it is crucial to avoid letting our practices be
steered astray by other tempting goals. Even well-intentioned scientific
investigation can be a source of catastrophic risk, as with retrieving
potentially contaminated materials from other planets or uncovering a
new dangerous technology. 158 Similarly, pursuing commercial or
nationalistic goals such as harvesting space resources may offer
immediate gains for some but create medium- and long-term risks for
all. 159 Tempering the influence of private interests is particularly difficult
in the age of global financial capitalism, where money not only offers

See discussion supra Section III(B) (describing anthropogenic risk).
Bostrom, supra note 95, at 3–4, 20–26.
152
Id.
153
Id. Wiener, supra note 104, at 76.
154
Wiener, supra note 104, at 73.
155
Id. at 76–77; Bostrom, supra note 95, at 20–21.
156
ORD, supra note 114, at 189.
157
Id.
158
See infra Sections IV(A)(1) and (2) (discussing these risks in a space
context).
159
See infra Section IV (discussing specific risks from uncoordinated private
and national space development).
150
151
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paths to pursue one’s personal goals but can also be used to alter policy
and legal regimes through lobbying. 160
Because of the strong need for international coordination and
conformity on some matters, 161 tribalism, including nationalism, is
another powerful influence worth acknowledging and at times
resisting. 162 As social animals, humans are ill-equipped to live on their
own and have therefore evolved with a propensity for social bonding and
commitment to an identifiable group. 163 Competition between groups
may have served humanity well in the past by helping select for certain
traits, but those traits are ill-fitted for the existential threats now facing
our species. 164 Intergroup hostility makes species-wide cooperation and
coordination more difficult, incentivizing people to spend their lives and
resources dominating each other instead of overcoming the threats we all
have in common. 165
Still, we appear to be making progress—moral attitudes are
slowly changing to be more inclusive, and most technologies are
leveraged for good. 166 The crucial question is whether our collective
wisdom will catch up to technological development before an existential
catastrophe occurs. To that end, it is worth considering the role space and
space technologies may play in contributing to existential risk.

IV. EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM SPACE DEVELOPMENT
In this Section, I identify ten sources of space-related existential
risk, loosely categorized as either sudden or gradual. Sudden risks are
triggered when some particular type or quantity of activity occurs and the
consequences are felt over a relatively short amount of time. By contrast,
gradual risks are those whose consequences scale up (e.g. linearly or
See generally KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITALISM: HOW THE LAW
CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY (2019) (discussing the mutual
reinforcement of capital and legal regimes).
161
See supra notes 129–141 and accompanying text.
162
See generally RON NEWBY, TRIBALISM: AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO
HUMANITY (2020) (describing one layperson’s perspective about the influence
of tribalism from an existential perspective).
163
See generally HAROLD ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE: GROUP IDENTITY AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (1975) (describing the origin and function of tribal
mentalities).
164
Bostrom, supra note 95, 3–4.
165
See Jay Jackson, Realistic Group Conflict Theory: A Review and Evaluation
of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 43 PSYCH. RECORD 395, 395 (1993)
(describing the ways intergroup hostility and feelings of outgroup prejudice can
arise as a result of conflicting goals and competition over limited resources).
166
Bostrom, supra note 99, at 27.
160
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exponentially) with more activity. Preventing sudden risks generally
requires that we avoid performing whatever activity generates the
catastrophe (or passing whatever threshold beyond which the catastrophe
would be triggered), while gradual risks may be alleviated incrementally
across time.
With this categorization in hand, I identify four sudden risks: (1)
dangerous asteroid trajectory-modification technologies, (2) back
contamination of the Earth, (3) military and geopolitical conflict, and (4)
dangers from developing extraterrestrial settlements. I also identify six
gradual risks: (1) damage to Earth’s biosphere or general environment,
(2) space debris, (3) light pollution interfering with terrestrial astronomy,
(4) risks from insufficient monitoring of rocket payloads, (5) squandering
of valuable space resources, and (6) dangerous economic acceleration or
disruption. I argue that all ten of these risks are exacerbated by a lack of
coordination and cooperation under the current space law and policy
regime.

A. Sudden Risks
1. Dangerous asteroid trajectory-modification
technologies
People often assume a large share of existential risk comes from
asteroids. 167 Accordingly, asteroid, comet, and meteor detection and
deflection receives substantially more funding than research into many
other sources of existential risk. 168 Scientists have devised creative ways
to blast or lure celestial objects off course, some of which are being
tested by NASA. 169 However, in reality, the natural risk of extinction via
a large asteroid or meteor strike is extremely small. 170 Because so many
potentially hazardous objects have been detected and their orbits tracked,
See Bostrom, supra note 95, at 18 (describing a “good-story bias” as applied
to asteroids).
168
Compare Casey Dreier, How NASA’s Planetary Defense Budget Grew By
More Than 4000% in 10 Years, PLANETARY SOCIETY (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.planetary.org/articles/nasas-planetary-defense-budget-growth
(noting approximately $150 million in annual NASA funding for planetary
defense) with Changes in Funding in the AI Safety Field, CENTRE FOR
EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM, (Feb. 1, 2017)
https://www.centreforeffectivealtruism.org/blog/changes-in-funding-in-the-aisafety-field (noting less than $10 million annual global spending on AI safety).
169
See Daisy Dobrijevic, DART asteroid mission: NASA's first planetary defense
spacecraft, SPACE.COM (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.space.com/dart-asteroidmission (describing NASA’s in-progress Double Asteroid Redirection Test
which involves crashing a satellite into an asteroid to redirect its path).
170
ORD, supra note 114, at 71.
167
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we have enough data to know that the baseline probability of an Earthimpact in an average century is about one in 1.5 million for asteroids
large enough to pose an existential threat (diameters of ten kilometers or
more). 171 Better yet, more than ninety-five percent of asteroids larger
than one kilometer have already been detected, and none of them are on a
trajectory with an appreciable chance of colliding with the Earth,
bringing the odds of a threatening impact to less than one in 150
million. 172
By contrast, there is considerable risk in deploying anti-asteroid
technology. Any technology capable of deflecting an asteroid away from
a collision course with Earth could also be used to move an asteroid into
a collision course with Earth. Carl Sagan and Stephen Ostro make the
point that “premature deployment of any asteroid orbit-modification
capability, in the real world and in light of well-established human frailty
and fallibility, may introduce a new category of danger that dwarfs that
posed by the objects themselves.” 173 Indeed, the odds of extinction by an
asteroid guided towards the Earth are almost certainly much greater than
one in 150 million.
The risks from dangerous asteroid orbit-modification
technologies are multifaceted. 174 Using asteroid redirection technology,
actors may take risky actions that they perceive to be in their selfinterests but actually have destructive results 175—an eccentric billionaire
or mining company, motivated by money, power, or status, redirecting an
asteroid to the Earth for ease of resource exploitation; a nation, motivated
by a desire to secure geopolitical or ideological advantage, using an
asteroid as a threat or weapon. Even where efforts are well intentioned,
some risks come from the potential for accidents such as malfunctions or
miscalculations of the dangers. 176 Other risks come from coordination
problems: disjointed efforts by various actors could inadvertently send an
asteroid into an undesired trajectory. Also, diplomatic concerns may
create additional difficulties, such as debates over how to allocate risks
between certain countries during the redirection process. 177
Id.
Id.
173
Carl Sagan & Steven Ostro, Dangers of Asteroid Deflection, 368 NATURE
501, 501 (1994).
174
Bostrom, supra note 137.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
See Alexis Madrigal, Saving Earth From an Asteroid Will Take Diplomats,
Not Heroes, WIRED (Dec. 19, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/12/savingearth-from-an-asteroid/ (“[Some groups] propose to bump or tow an asteroid ‘in
a controlled manner’ so that it misses Earth. The only problem is that such a
171
172
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Then there is what Nick Bostrom describes as “the apocalyptic
residual”—the near-guarantee that there are actors who would act in
ways that intentionally destroy civilization. 178 Some existential risk
comes from the possibility that members of the apocalyptic residual
become empowered to destroy humanity. 179 Consider that members of
Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese doomsday cult, released anthrax spores from
a cooling tower in 1993 in an attempt to start a pandemic, and in 1994
and 1995 carried out high-profile deadly sarin gas attacks. 180 After the
attacks, police raided the group’s headquarters and were astounded to
find weapons-manufacturing technology, a Russian military helicopter,
and enough sarin gas to kill four million people. 181 Aum Shinrikyo
members hold the belief that killing people is a form of saving them from
bad karma and aspire to cause a worldwide nuclear Armageddon. 182
Members of groups like Aum Shinrikyo have sought to obtain weapons
capable of threatening humanity and, if successful, would likely choose
to use them. 183 Orbit modification technologies could be another tool for
misuse and abuse by such apocalyptic groups, especially if such
technologies eventually become popularized. 184

process would take time and as the asteroid's trajectory changed, it would be
‘pointed’ at different places along a horizontal plane on Earth called the risk
corridor. That's a major geopolitical problem … because it requires temporarily
increasing the risk to one population … to eventually eliminate the risk for the
entire Earth.”)
178
Bostrom, supra note 137, at 460 (“Given the diversity of human character
and circumstance, for any ever so imprudent, immoral, or self-defeating action,
there is some residual fraction of humans who would choose to take that
action.”). See generally Karl Umbrasas, The Life Course of Apocalyptic
Groups, 11 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 32 (2018) (describing apocalyptic groups).
179
Bostrom, supra note 137, at 460.
180
Hiroshi Takanashi et al., Bacillus anthracis Bioterrorism Incident, Kameido,
Tokyo, 1993, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 117, 117–20 (2004).
181
Holly Fletcher, Aum Shinrikyo, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 19,
2012), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/aum-shinrikyo.
182
Umbrasas, supra note 178.
183
See, e.g., Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop
Biological and Chemical Weapons, CTR. NEW AM. SEC. (2011); see also K.B.
Olson, Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, 513 (1999); see also ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI.
& INT’L AFF., AL QAEDA WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREAT: HYPE OR
REALITY? (2010).
184
In one science fiction series, anti-Earth insurgents located in the outer reaches
of the solar system use simple asteroid mining spacecraft to lob numerous large
asteroids at the Earth to disastrous effect. See JAMES S. A. COREY, NEMESIS
GAMES 2015.
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Because of both deliberate and unintentional perils, dangerous
technologies must be carefully monitored and safeguarded from falling
into the wrong hands. Unless and until we can be overwhelmingly
confident that orbit-modification technologies or any other dangerous
emergent space technologies are safe enough to allow for use under
properly regulated conditions, there is a need for international
coordination to minimize the risks, potentially including restrictions or
regulations on specific technology usage and the development of
surveillance and enforcement capabilities. However, the current system
of decentralized state supervision set in place by the OST is grossly
inadequate for these purposes, in part due to the risk of dangerous
activities proliferating under flags of convenience. 185
2. Back contamination and planetary protection
Space development carries risks of back contamination, the
transfer of potentially harmful extraterrestrial organisms or other
contamination into Earth’s biosphere. 186 History is ridden with examples
of the harmful introduction of biota to new environments, including
microbes following human migrations sparking epidemics like malaria,
the bubonic plague, and smallpox, 187 and invasive species that
outcompete and threaten native populations. 188 There are concerns that
spacecrafts returning from missions to other celestial bodies could
inadvertently carry microbial organisms or other unforeseen
contaminants that, if introduced into the Earth’s biosphere, might have
devastating runaway effects like starting a deadly pandemic or
consuming all the Earth’s oxygen in a chemical chain reaction. 189 These
risks are now more salient than ever thanks to increases in space activity,
including independent Mars sample return missions planned by the US
and China. 190
Article IX of the OST calls on nations to adopt measures that
help avoid causing “adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
See supra Section II(C) (describing the issue of flags of convenience).
See Shu Boboila, A Multi-Agency Regulatory Framework to Prevent
Interplanetary Contamination, in Hamilton et al., supra note 3, at 2 (noting
concerns about back contamination procedures).
187
CHARLES SUTHERLAND ELTON, THE ECOLOGY OF INVASIONS BY ANIMALS
AND PLANTS 196 (Univ. of Chi. Press Ed. 2000).
188
H. A. Mooney & E. E. Cleland, The Evolutionary Impact of Invasive Species,
PNAS (May 8, 2001), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC33232/.
189
Wiener, supra note 104, at 74.
190
Paul Marks, Why Bringing Martian Rocks back to Earth Is a Bad Idea,
NEWSCIENTIST (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg25033323-100-why-bringing-martianrocks-back-to-earth-is-a-bad-idea/.
185
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resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter[.]” 191 However,
this provision has no history of enforcement, and in any case, spacefaring
nations are permitted to vary in their approaches to preventing back
contamination. 192 Given this weak legal backdrop, it is not difficult to
imagine governments or private actors failing to take adequate
prevention measures, whether intentionally to reduce costs and
inconveniences or unintentionally due to substandard scientific
understanding or misevaluation of the risks. Illustratively, in what was
hailed at the time as “a major gap in the quarantine defenses,” 193 NASA
itself circumvented the United States’ own Congressionally-backed
contamination procedures, deciding independently that it would risk
exposing the atmosphere to lunar dust for the first time in order to
expedite retrieval of the Apollo 11 astronauts. 194 The fact that such
decisions are left to space actors exacerbates a public goods problem
where the costs of mitigation are borne fully by those who would only
receive a fraction of the overall benefit. 195 Coordination is needed to
secure conformity in actors’ commitments to avoiding back
contamination.
3. Military and geopolitical conflict
Military and geopolitical conflict is one of the most significant
direct and indirect sources of existential risk. 196 One major risk comes
from the direct threat of nuclear war. 197 Thousands of nuclear weapons
Supra note 19.
Victoria Sutton, Planetary Protection and Regulating Human Health: A Risk
that is Not Zero, 19 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 71, 85 (2020). The US and
China currently follow COSPAR’s nonbinding recommendations. COSPAR
POLICY ON PLANETARY PROTECTION (2021),
https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/assets/uploads/2021/07/PPPolicy_2021_3-June.pdf.
193
Space: Is the Earth Safe from Lunar Contamination?, TIME MAG. (June 13,
1969), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,942095,00.html.
194
See Wiener, supra note 104, at 74 (“When the Apollo 11 capsule returned to
earth from landing on the moon in 1969, it splashed down at sea and the ship
approached to retrieve it. While the original quarantine protocol had called for
the astronauts to remain inside the sealed spacecraft until it was lifted onto the
ship’s deck and into the quarantine facility, ‘NASA ofﬁcials began to have
second thoughts about the discomforts the astronauts would endure if they were
conﬁned too long in a hot spacecraft buffeted by ocean waves. . . Deciding to
trade one risk for another, NASA, without fanfare, changed its recovery plan.’”).
195
See supra Section III(B) (describing the public goods problems inherent in
existential risk mitigation).
196
See ORD, supra note 114, at 175–176 (noting that great power conflicts make
up a greater share of total existential risk than any individual risk).
197
Joseph Cirincione, The Continuing Threat of Nuclear War, in GLOBAL
CATASTROPHIC RISKS, supra note 102, at 382.
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sit on hair-trigger alert with a non-negligible chance of use each year,
sometimes even due to mistakes. 198 Enough nuclear detonations might
render the global environment unsuitable for human life. 199 Additionally,
geopolitical rivalries push the boundaries of research into other
dangerous technologies, such as nanotechnology or bioweapons that
could be deployed to even more devastating effect. 200 Such rivalries also
foster distrust that makes cooperation on other issues, such as climate
change, more difficult. 201
Space development can and does serve as a source of
destabilization and conflict, both in space and on the Earth. 202 First, as
commercial interests become increasingly important and competitive,
they raise the stakes of control over space and invite aggressive
behaviors. 203 In addition to the enormous commercial and strategic value
of Earth’s orbital planes, 204 the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter is
estimated to be worth quintillions of dollars. 205 A new space race may be
Id. (“In January 1995, a global nuclear war almost started by mistake.
Russian military officials mistook a Norwegian weather rocket for a US
submarine-launched ballistic missile. Boris Yelstin became the first Russian
president to ever have the 'nuclear suitcase' open in front of him. He had just a
few minutes to decide if he should push the button that would launch a barrage
of nuclear missiles. Thankfully, he concluded that his radars were in error.”).
199
Id.
200
See, e.g., Ali Nouri & Christopher F. Chyba, Biotechnology and Biosecurity,
in GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS, supra note 102, at 451 (noting the
development of dangerous biotechnology by geopolitical rivals).
201
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (describing freeriding
incentivized by national self-interest).
202
Stuart Clark, ‘It’s Going to Happen’: Is the World Ready for War in Space?,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/apr/15/its-going-to-happen-is-worldready-for-war-in-space.
203
Id. See also DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 198 (“It is unclear why[, to space
expansionists,] the often violent conflicts over mineral resources on Earth would
not also expand into space.”).
204
See Akhil Rao, The Economics of Orbit Use: Theory, Policy, and
Measurement iii, (2019) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado),
https://www.pnas.org/content/117/23/12756 (noting the economic value of orbit
use to be on the scale of trillions of dollars).
205
Bi India Bureau, Asteroids Contain Metals Worth Quintillions of dollars—
But Mining Them Won’t Necessarily Make You Richer Than Bezos or Musk ,
BUS. INSIDER (https://www.businessinsider.in/science/space/news/asteroidscontain-metals-worth-quintillions-of-dollars-but-mining-them-wont-necessarilymake-your-richer-than-bezos-or-musk/articleshow/83989878.cms (June 30,
2021), https://www.businessinsider.in/science/space/news/asteroids-containmetals-worth-quintillions-of-dollars-but-mining-them-wont-necessarily-makeyour-richer-than-bezos-or-musk/articleshow/83989878.cms.
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emerging to stake claims to these resources as well as the even more
limited ones available on the Moon and Mars. 206 Economic competition
is historically the most significant factor precipitating global conflict, 207
especially in conditions permitting colonial powers to exercise territorial
influence from afar. 208 These tensions are further exacerbated by the
ubiquity of dual-use technologies in space, 209 which has already caused
tension between commercial company SpaceX and China’s military. 210
Given this backdrop, one researcher describes space conflict as
“absolutely inevitable[.]” 211
Second, space weaponization may upset the fragile equilibria
underpinning mutually-assured destruction. In the age of nuclear
deterrence, strategic stability involves a complex combination of factors,
including crisis stability—the propensity of actors to not escalate
conflict, even in times of crisis—and arms race stability, the propensity
to avoid deployments that incentivize first strikes. 212 Space-based
military assets complicate these factors, sometimes unpredictably. 213
Unlike ground-based missiles, space-based weapons have easy and quick
access to attacks anywhere on the globe, leaving few opportunities for
early-warning, prevention, and retaliation systems to activate in time to
be effective—decreasing crisis stability. 214 From space, it is also easier to
strike without it being clear which actor is responsible, reducing the

Justin Bachman, New Space Race Shoots for Moon and Mars on a Budget,
WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/newspace-race-shoots-for-moon-and-mars-on-a-budget/2021/08/20/5f7a0eac-01c711ec-87e0-7e07bd9ce270_story.html.
207
Daron Acemoglu et al., A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars, 127 Q. J.
ECONS. 283, 283 (2012).
208
See generally THOMAS RID & THOMAS KEANEY, UNDERSTANDING
COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE: DOCTRINE, OPERATIONS, AND CHALLENGES
(2010) (describing the heightened risks of conflict among colonial powers); see
also DEUDNEY, supra note 10, 345–46 (describing the link between
expansionism and conflict as applied to space).
209
See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (describing dual-use
technologies in space).
210
Li Xiaoli, Starlink’s expansion, military ambitions alert world, CHINA
MILITARY ONLINE (May 5, 2022), http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/202205/05/content_10152439.htm.
211
Clark, supra note 202 (quoting Michael Schmitt).
212
Christopher Chyba, New Technologies & Strategic Stability, 149 DAEDALUS
150, 155 (2020) (describing space weaponization).
213
Jürgen Altmann, Space Laser Weapons: Problems of Strategic Stability, 19
BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 343, 347 (1988).
214
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 235.
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perceived risk of retaliation and therefore raising the risk of a first
strike. 215
Also, satellites function as force multipliers, which creates risks.
Satellites have brought about a so-called “accuracy revolution” which
has increased the ability of missiles to hit targets precisely. 216 With
sufficiently detailed information about the positions of enemy forces—
perhaps guided by artificial intelligence 217—the risks rise that an actor
may launch an attack in an attempt at a disarming first strike. 218
The strategic importance of satellites makes the deployment of
ASATs a particularly pressing problem. Satellites serve as a cornerstone
in modern warfare and deterrence via early warning, surveillance, and
the command, control, and communication of nuclear forces. ASATs are
therefore crucial tools in disabling an adversary’s ability to retaliate. If
ASAT capacity reaches a critical mass, then an actor may perceive that
the scales have tipped in favor of a first strike. Also, even if an ASAT is
used in a limited strike and not as part of a comprehensive first strike
plan, a blinded adversary may believe it is under a more severe attack
and quickly retaliate with its arsenals. Furthermore, even if ASATs are
not actually used at all, their mere deployment increases the risk of
accidental or inadvertent warfare escalation. If satellites unexpectedly go
offline, a nation may believe it is under attack. With constellations of
military satellites travelling at high velocities in an environment
increasingly filled with space debris, false alarms are inevitable and may
be attributed to an adversary’s ASAT.
Finally, space weaponization lends itself to the creation of more
devastating and costly forms of warfare. For one, conflict in space would
create enormous amounts of space debris. 219 Many weapons have a large
area of effect, the most noteworthy of which are nuclear weapons which,
when exploded in or near space, would disable swaths of both civil and
military satellites. 220 (Many people may overlook the fact that any
nuclear state equipped with ballistic missiles possesses latent,
indiscriminate ASATs.) 221 Worse still, humanity continues to devise new
Chyba, supra note 212; see also Gwern Branwen, Colder Wars,
www.gwern.net/Colder-Wars (last visited Feb. 1, 2022) (considering
hypothetical first-strike scenarios).
216
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 159.
217
Chyba, supra note 212.
218
Chyba, supra note 212; DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 161.
219
Ramin Skibba & Undark, The Ripple Effects of a Space Skirmish, ATLANTIC
(July 12, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/spacewarfare-unregulated/614059/.
220
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, 165–66.
221
Id.
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destructive techniques to mar each other. 222 In the context of space there
is already discussion of weaponized asteroids or planetoids, 223 mass
drivers exploited for kinetic bombardment, 224 and planet-killing nuclear,
antimatter bombs, or geoengineering devices developed by enemies of
the Earth. 225 To prevent such speculative weapons from being made real,
there is a strong need for confidence-building measures and progress
towards norms of disarmament and demilitarization.
4. Risks from developing extraterrestrial settlements
Becoming a multiplanetary civilization may need to be an
essential part of humanity’s long-term strategy for achieving existential
security. 226 Many existential risks are global in scope, not extraglobal;
so, having a self-sustaining extraterrestrial settlement 227 would raise the
chances that humanity survives what would otherwise be an existential
catastrophe. 228 With such a settlement, a planet-wide catastrophe would
be overwhelmingly tragic but at least not species ending, giving
humanity a chance to learn from its mistakes. It is undeniably a good
idea to also heavily invest in specific existential risk mitigation
measures, such as researching safe technology development. However, it
is also important to recognize that it is a tall order to get all of our
precautions sufficiently right the first time. There is considerable value in

See also The Most Dangerous Space Weapons Ever, SPACE.COM (Dec. 21,
2016), https://www.space.com/19-top-10-space-weapons.html.
223
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 176.
224
Id. at 177.
225
Id. at 207–11.
226
NEWITZ, supra note 2.
227
There are substantial differences between “settlement” and “colonization;” it
is crucial to examine these differences to avoid perpetuating colonialist or
imperialist thoughts and practices in space. See Mike Wall, Bill Nye: It’s Space
Settlement, Not Colonization, SPACE.COM (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://www.space.com/bill-nye-space-settlement-not-colonization.html
(describing some objectionable features of colonialism in the space context).
228
Of the known existential risks, many of them would likely only affect a
single planet: asteroid impact, supervolcanic eruption, climate change, and
environmental damage, including from a nuclear war. Some existential risks
might affect multiple planets, depending on the circumstances: stellar explosion
or other cosmic events, pandemics, unaligned artificial intelligence, or some
other dangerous emergent technology. For these risks, a multiplanetary
civilization still has more opportunities to survive—for example, with sufficient
quarantining protocols, a pandemic might be prevented from spreading between
planets.
222
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diversifying our existential risk mitigation strategy by including both
specific and general mitigation measures. 229
While the development of extraterrestrial settlements may be
useful in a long-term strategy for human development, it would not be
worth rushing for if it came at the cost of imposing even small degrees of
existential risk. 230 Because of the long time horizons involved in
establishing self-sustaining settlements that genuinely do not rely on
Earth, 231 they may be of little use for existential security in the near
term. 232 Also, the opportunity costs in delaying may be very small or
even nonexistent, as technologies in the future will likely make the
development of self-sustaining settlements easier, safer, and faster. In
fact, if technology growth is rapid enough, then a space settlement that

See Owen Cotton-Barratt et al., Defence in Depth Against Human Extinction:
Prevention, Response, Resilience, and Why They All Matter, 11 GLOB. POL. 271,
272 (2020) (describing a multilayered strategy for existential security including
prevention, response, and resilience).
230
Nick Bostrom, Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed
Technological Development, 15 UTILITAS 308, at *5 (2003) (“Because the
lifespan of galaxies is measured in billions of years, whereas the time-scale of
any delays that we could realistically affect would rather be measured in years
or decades, the consideration of risk trumps the consideration of opportunity
cost. For example, a single percentage point of reduction of existential risks
would be worth (from a utilitarian expected utility point-of-view) a delay of over
10 million years. Therefore, if our actions have even the slightest effect on the
probability of eventual colonization, this will outweigh their effect on when
colonization takes place.”).
231
By current estimations, a genuinely self-sustaining settlement will take
hundreds of years to establish, given the difficulty of adapting to harsh space
environments. Kelsey Piper, The case against colonizing space to save
humanity, VOX (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/10/22/17991736/jeff-bezos-elon-musk-colonizing-mars-moonspace-blue-origin-spacex; see also DEUDNEY, supra note 10, 363–64 (noting it is
very uncertain how long self-sustaining settlements would take, but estimating
“several centuries”). Further, optimistic estimates do not fully consider the
degree of dependence a space settlement would have on Earth. See Patrick
Wilson et al., Systems for Resource Equality in Martian Society from
Foundation to Independence, in Hamilton et al., supra note 3, 88–92.
232
Marko Kovic, Risks of space colonization, 126 FUTURES 102638, at *4
(2021) (“Early colonization eﬀorts are unlikely to mitigate existential risks as
much as targeted existential risk mitigation strategies because the early stages of
colonization are bound to be small in scale and fragile. Early habitats would in
eﬀect do next to nothing to mitigate existential risks, so creating those early
habitats as quickly as possible would do very little in terms of existential risk
mitigation.”).
229
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starts later may actually be the one that becomes self-sustaining
sooner. 233
Unfortunately, the development of space settlements may in fact
create more existential risk. First, the process of establishing a settlement
may be costly in ways that negatively impact survival prospects for
Earth. The development of a settlement, such as on Mars, would demand
many resources from the Earth. For example, although Mars is known to
have some in situ water, a settlement will likely still demand tremendous
amounts of fresh water from the Earth, which could exacerbate resource
tensions underpinned by climate change. 234
Second, as humanity becomes increasingly dispersed across space,
various other risks rise. There is no guarantee about the types of political,
cultural, or other social traditions that may emerge. 235 Some space
settlement advocates consider this to be a virtue, but it may also be a
vice. One disadvantage is that existence of extraterrestrial settlements
may make it more difficult to surveil and enforce against existentiallyrisk activities, 236 such as the development of dangerous artificial
intelligence. 237
Another disadvantage is that the development of a space
diaspora may guarantee the emergence of deadly interplanetary
conflict. 238 Expansion across the solar system would almost certainly
result in extreme diversities in human culture and governance which,
when combined with high effective distances and the inevitable capacity
to readily inflict destruction on each other, creates a breeding ground for

A similar hypothesis in interstellar travel contexts is the “incessant
obsolescence postulate,” according to which the speed of technology
development makes it more advantageous to launch later rather than sooner,
because the later, more advanced ships will pass the earlier, less advanced ships
en route. See Andrew Kennedy, Interstellar Travel—The Wait Calculation and
the Incentive Trap of Progress, 59 J. OF THE BRIT. INTERPLANETARY SOC’Y. 239,
242 (2006) (describing a calculation for optimal start times in situations of of
rapid technological growth). A delayed-start settlement may have more
technologically advanced foundations compared to its earlier counterpart that
enhance reliability, better conserve finite resources, and speed up the process of
becoming self-sustaining.
234
Wilson et al., supra note 231, at 89.
235
Phil Torres, Space colonization and suffering risks: Reassessing the
“maxipok rule”, 100 FUTURES 74, 74 (2018); DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 220.
236
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 208, 359.
237
Id. at 360.
238
See id. at 356 (describing nine reasons space expansion will trend towards
conflict).
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intense rivalries. 239 Solar system-wide common governance and mutual
restraints may be very difficult to create and sustain. 240 In the explosion
of culture, there will also almost certainly be some actors who desire to
cause widespread harm. 241 Given humanity’s track record on Earth, it is
difficult to imagine a populated solar system without a generous serving
of violence. If the means of destruction are sufficiently high, as would be
nearly guaranteed in a scenario where the technology necessary to
support expansive space settlement exists, then the result may be an
increase in overall existential risk. 242
In sum, humanity may eventually benefit from settling off of
Earth, but it needs to get its act together before setting off on a course
that leads to ruination. The current open-access space regime does not
contemplate such needs; actors continue to race towards developing
space settlements before knowing (or without caring) whether a peaceful
future is possible, and if so, how it may be guaranteed. Crucially, such
questions must be addressed before expansion is too far underway. Once
started, space expansion might be impossible to stop or even regulate,
such as if a settlement becomes both self-sustaining and politically
independent from the Earth. 243 Also, the foundations of any space
expansion effort may have an enormous influence on whether the path
ends in peace or conflict. 244 For example, upon reflection, we may find
that settlements founded by people with peaceful ideologies and robust
governance systems are less likely to eventually cause conflict than
settlements founded for the sole purpose of profit maximization or under
heterogeneous or libertarian ideologies. Here, as elsewhere, it is better to
be cautious and coordinated than speedy and reckless.

Id. at 357; Torres, supra note 235, at 79 (“[E]xpansion into space will
generate phylogenetic and ideological diversity that could yield profoundly
disparate types of civilizations. The species who comprise these civilizations
could have entirely diﬀerent normative preferences, moral tendencies, and even
scientiﬁc institutions. Some will almost certainly be violence-inclined, thus
giving others an incentive to strike ﬁrst. Even more, diversity with respect to
cognition, emotionality, and language will undercut the mutual trust needed for
otherwise irenic civilizations to avoid spirals of militarization or defect in
prisoner’s dilemma predicaments. Thus, a colonized cosmos would be an arena
poised and spring-loaded for violence.”)
240
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 357; see also notes 178–184 and accompanying
text (describing the “apocalyptic residual”).
241
Torres, supra note 235, 77–78.
242
Id. at 80–81 (discussing so-called “weapons of total destruction”).
243
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 363.
244
See infra notes 327–329 and accompanying text (describing governance of
the cosmic commons).
239
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B. Gradual Risks
1. Biosphere damage and environmental approaches
Many potential extinction scenarios involve modification to
Earth’s environment. 245 Runaway anthropogenic climate change, in the
worst-case (albeit unlikely) scenarios, could trigger amplifying feedback
loops—the same process that apparently led to Venus becoming the
inhospitable planet we see today. 246 More concerning in the near term are
the stressors that climate change is sure to cause—climate change,
already a major geopolitical issue, may leave us more prone to other
existential risks, such as war over depleting resources. 247 Another
worrying scenario is that actors could deploy geoengineering techniques
intending to reverse climate change, but end up inadvertently rendering
Earth’s environment uninhabitable. 248
The point generally emphasizes the need for global coordination,
but it also directly implicates space policies. For example, the risks of
geonengineering technologies being deployed on Earth may be related to
the development of similar techniques for terraforming Mars. 249 Also,
rocket engine exhaust impacts the atmosphere. 250 As byproducts of the
launch process, emissions of chlorine, alumina, and black carbon directly
into the sensitive stratosphere can cause ozone depletion and other forms
of climate change. 251 While rocket pollution is only one of many
contributors to climate change, the full scope of the problem is not yet
well understood, and other climate change contributors are generally not
slowing down. Furthermore, dramatic increases in space activity fueled
by increasingly frequent rocket launches could strain an already

ORD, supra note 114, at 102–112. See also David Frame & Myles R. Allen,
Climate Change and Global Risk, in GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS, supra note
97, at 265 (describing the difficulty in quantifying climate change risks).
246
Luckily, while the science is far from settled, current research suggests that
such results are unlikely due to anthropogenic effects. ORD, supra note 114, at
104.
247
Id. at 103.
248
See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER.
INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK, NOT AVOIDING IT 117 (2014) (describing
geoengineering risk scenarios).
249
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 207.
250
Nicole Mortillaro, Rocket Launches Could Be Affecting Our Ozone Layer,
Say Experts, CBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2021),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/rocket-launches-environment-1.5995252.
251
Id.
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weakened atmosphere. Launches have increased exponentially since at
least 2002. 252
Space activities may also indirectly affect environmental risks on
Earth. Some scholars worry about opportunity costs—some of the
resources that go to space activities might otherwise have been put
towards better environmental uses. 253 Others worry that emphasizing the
viability of extraterrestrial settlements may contribute to moral hazard, a
situation under economic thought where perceived protection from risks
cause actors to lack incentive to guard against those risks. In the worst
case, the fervor of space expansion may contribute to a “disposable
planet mentality” under which some actors neglect to protect the Earth
(perhaps as a “lost cause”). 254
On the other hand, space activities also have some environmental
benefits. Satellites have a litany of uses in detecting climate change and
identifying potential interventions. 255 Also, the first photographs of Earth
from space cultivated a sense of fragility and shared humanity that
helped give rise to the environmental movement in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, as well as shaped it into a global project rather than one
focused on localized concerns. 256 Similarly, many astronauts report
experiencing a so-called “overview effect”: a cognitive shift in
awareness from seeing Earth first-hand from space, leading to a sense of
awe, shared humanity, and respect for nature. 257 Experiments have been

Spencer Kaplan, Successful U.S. Space Launches, AEROSPACE SEC. (June 30,
2020), https://aerospace.csis.org/data/u-s-space-launch/.
253
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, 239.
254
Id. See also John Bonazzo, Stephen Hawking Says Humans Have No LongTerm Future on Earth, OBSERVER (June 21, 2017),
https://observer.com/2017/06/stephen-hawking-space-human-survival/
(characterizing Stephen Hawking’s view as the Earth being a “lost cause”).
255
Emanuela Barbiroglio, Satellite Science is Helping the Environment, from
Farms to Oceans, Forbes (Sep. 23, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emanuelabarbiroglio/2020/09/23/satellite-scienceis-helping-the-environment-from-farms-to-oceans/?sh=692c9e1876e4.
256
Mike Wall, Earth Day at 50: How Apollo 8’s Earthrise’ photo helped spark
the first celebration, SPACE.COM (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.space.com/earthrise-image-apollo-8-earth-day-50thanniversary.html; see generally Benjamin Lazier, Earthrise; or, The
Globalization of the World Picture, 116 AM. HIST. REV. 602 (2011) (discussing
philosophical and historical dimensions of the “Earthrise” photograph).
257
David Yaden et al., The overview effect: Awe and self-transcendent
experience in space flight. 3 PSYCHOL. OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORY, RES. &
PRAC. 1, 1 (2016).
252
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devised to replicate this effect upon the Earth using sensory-deprivation
tanks and virtual reality headsets. 258
Whether the net effect of environmental impacts from space
activities is positive or negative, most environmental impacts mere
externalities to space actors. 259 Various measures, including central
planning, may help facilitate more of the positive—and less of the
risky—environmental effects of space activities. 260
2. Space debris
Space debris is a negative externality of space development.
Most orbital debris is human-generated, such as pieces of spacecraft and
boosters, inoperable satellites, remnants of explosions (such as from
military weapons tests), equipment and trash from crewed missions, and
solidified liquids and byproducts from rocket engines—even frozen
shards of human urine. 261 Debris poses hazards to all forms of space
activity, including those conducted by satellites, spacecraft, and space
telescopes. 262 When traveling at the high speeds necessary to remain in
orbit, even the smallest objects, such as flecks of paint, can strike with
the force of a bowling ball. 263 Impacts can also occur on the surface of
the Earth, where larger objects often reach the ground intact. NASA

U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE CLINICAL TRIALS ARCHIVE,
Flotation-REST and Virtual Reality of The Overview Effect,
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/history/NCT04155268?V_3 (last visited Jan. 1,
2022).
259
Environmental impacts tend to be dispersed across large numbers of people
and across long periods of time. See Malcolm Fairbrother, Externalities: why
environmental sociology should bring them in, 2 ENVTL. SOC. 375, 376 (2016)
(defining environmental externalities).
260
See generally Andy Lawrence et al., The case for space environmentalism, 6
NAT. ASTRONOMY 428 (2022) (discussing various measures for managing space
environmental consequences).
261
Daria Diaz, Trashing the Final Frontier: An Examination of Space Debris
from a Legal Perspective, 6 TUL. ENVIRON. L. J. 369, 371–72 (1993) (“In 1984,
the Solar Max satellite was permanently disabled after it collided thousands of
times with what may have been nearly invisible pieces of rocket fuel or satellite
fragments. Scientists who examined the aforementioned debris also discovered
microscopic shards of human urine.”) (footnote omitted).
262
Id.
263
See Gunnar Leinberg, Orbital Space Debris, 4 J.L. & TECH. 93, 998 (1989)
(noting that “[a] 3 mm piece of space debris traveling at 10 km/sec. has as much
kinetic energy as a 12 lb bowling bowl travelling at 60 mph,” and that the
Challenger shuttle collision with a 0.2 mm paint fleck “le[ft] a crater
approximately 2.4 mm across and 0.63 mm deep that cost $50,000 to replace”).
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estimates that on average one cataloged piece of debris has fallen back to
the Earth each day for the past 50 years. 264
Space debris experiences a feedback loop: the more debris there
is in orbit, the more likely there are to be collisions, which themselves
create more debris. 265 This exponential cascading effect is the reason
space debris poses an existential concern. In a phenomenon known as
Kessler Syndrome, once a critical density of debris is reached, a runaway
chain reaction of collisions may render entire orbital planes unusable or
even functionally impassable. 266 The effects of Kessler Syndrome will
dramatically raise the length of time humanity remains a one-planet
civilization. Besides any potential risks posed by a loss of crucial space
technologies, a land-locked humanity would be vulnerable to numerous
other existential risks, including the eventual exhaustion of Earth’s
resources. 267 Unlike with ocean shipwrecks, most satellite debris sinks
very slowly, remaining in orbit for centuries. 268 Unfortunately, according
to some computational models, we have already passed the “tipping
point” for runaway debris—and we did so just 40 years after inventing
space flight. 269 Even without any more space activity, collisions will
continue ramping up. 270 Take, for example, the 2009 collision between a
defunct Soviet satellite and an active U.S. company’s communication
satellite, which destroyed both and created over 2,000 pieces of new
debris which themselves will go on to cause new collisions and debris. 271
And because of the nature of exponential growth, the overwhelming
majority of collisions will occur long after the process is out of control—
probably before any acceleration in collisions is even detectable. 272
Frequently Asked Questions: Orbital Debris, NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/news/debris_faq.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
265
Mike Wall, Kessler Syndrome and the Space Debris Problem, SPACE.COM
(Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris.
266
Id.
267
Bostrom, supra note 95, at 11.
268
Raffi Khatchadourian, The Elusive Peril of Space Junk, NEW YORKER (Sept.
21, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/09/28/the-elusive-perilof-space-junk.
269
Donald J. Kessler & Phillip D. Anz-Meador, Critical Number of Spacecraft
in Low Earth Orbit: Using Satellite Fragmentation Data to Evaluate the
Stability of the Orbital Debris Environment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON SPACE DEBRIS 265 (2001).
270
Id.
271
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, International Space Station
Again Dodges Debris,15 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, July 2011, at 1.
272
Humans are notoriously bad at intuiting the effects of exponential growth.
See Martin Schonger and Daniela Sele, Intuition and exponential growth: bias
and the roles of parameterization and complexity, 68 MATHEMATISCHE
264
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International space law currently imposes virtually no costs for
creating space debris. 273 Governmental compliance with debrisprevention and mitigation measures is voluntary. 274 While countries may
be held liable for actual damages caused by their space objects, it is
rarely possible to trace and prove whose debris fragment was the
ultimate cause of a collision, let alone that the damage was due to one
party’s negligence. 275 Active debris removal efforts are further frustrated
by the fact that the technologies necessary to remove space junk can also
be used to destroy an opponent’s satellites. 276 Distrust not only prevents
adequate cooperation, it also incentivizes space pollution. For example,
US, Russia, and China have repeatedly used space to test anti-satellite
weapons responsible for thousands of pieces of orbital debris 277 without
legal consequence. 278 Coordination is necessary to craft measures which
would internalize the costs of creating space debris, foster trust necessary
to facilitate active debris removal, and prevent geopolitical or economic

SEMESTERBERICHTE 221, 233 (2021) (describing exponential growth bias and
the need for policymakers to override their intuitions when dealing with
exponential growth).
273
See Akhil Rao et al., Orbital-Use fees Could more Than Quadruple the Value
of the Space Industry, 117 PNAS 12756, 12756 (2020) (“[S]atellite operators do
not account for costs they impose on each other via collision risk.”).
274
See U.N. COPUOS, Compendium on Space Debris Mitigation Standards
Adopted by States and International Organizations; UN Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/2016/CRP.16, Apr. 5, 2016 (inviting, not requiring, states to
participate in debris-prevention and mitigation).
275
See Timothy G. Nelson, Regulating the Void: In-Orbit Collisions and Space
Debris, 40 J. SPACE L. 105, 107 n.10 (2014) (noting the destruction of at least
five satellites that might have been due to space debris, though experts cannot be
certain).
276
Rada Popova & Volker Schaus, The Legal Framework for Space Debris
Remediation as a Tool for Sustainability in Outer Space, 5 AEROSPACE 55, at
*10 (2018).
277
Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American and Russian
Anti-Satellite Testing in Space, THE SPACE REV. (Mar. 17, 2014),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1. See also, Space Debris from
Anti-Satellite Weapons, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2008),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/debris-in-brief-factsheet.pdf
(noting that Chinese and American weapon testing was a significant source of
orbital debris).
278
See Britain Concerned by Chinese Satellite Shoot-Down, SPACE WAR (Jan.
19, 2007),
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Britain_Concerned_By_Chinese_Satellite_Sh
oot_Down_999.html (noting Britain’s position that the 2007 Chinese ASAT test
does not contravene international law).
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rivalries from continuing to incentivize the pollution of our orbital
commons. 279

3. Light pollution
Light pollution—the presence of artificial light in otherwise dark
conditions—is one of space development’s externalities. Satellites and
even small debris in orbit reflect sunlight, appearing in the sky as points
of light that directly and indirectly impede observations made by groundbased telescopes. 280 Whenever space objects come into frame, they
appear as stark white streaks on the delicate, long-exposure instruments
that are attempting to observe much more distant and faint
phenomena. 281 Already, there is nowhere left on Earth where
astronomers can view the stars without space-based light pollution: Even
where individual space objects are not in view, the collective cloud of
metal scatters light back into the atmosphere, currently increasing the
brightness of the night sky by about ten percent. 282 In addition, nonvisible communications between satellites and receivers on the ground
can adversely impact observations by radio telescopes. 283
The impacts of light pollution are still being researched, but they
appear to include harms to human health, the environment, and the
economy. 284 Further, interference with Earth-based astronomy is
concerning from the standpoint of existential risk mitigation for three
reasons. First, telescopes play a crucial role in detecting cosmic threats to
the Earth like asteroids and comets, solar flares, gamma-ray bursts, close
encounters with large objects like black holes, and potentially threatening
extraterrestrial beings. 285 The vast majority of astronomy is done from
See Hobe & Chen, supra note 30, at 40 (“[E]nacting binding rules for space
debris mitigation might be the only avenue available today to prevent and to
minimize the growing orbital population of space debris.”).
280
Mark Strauss, Orbital Debris Creates a New Problem: Light Pollution,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 2021), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-spacemagazine/bright-lights-big-problem-180977824.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
SKAO Needs Corrective Measures From Satellite ‘Mega-Constellation’
Operators To Minimise Impact On Its Telescopes, SKAO (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.skatelescope.org/news/skao-satellite-impact-analysis/.
284
Tim B. Hunter & David L. Crawford, Economics of Light Pollution,
CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-astronomical-unioncolloquium/article/economics-of-lightpollution/17753488673F087EF3E1477A33E04730.
285
Ethan Siegel, This Is Why We Can't Just Do All Of Our Astronomy From
Space, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2019),
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the Earth, in part because telescopes on the ground offer some unique
advantages compared to their space-based counterparts. 286
Second, the insights generated by astronomy have been and will
continue to be crucial for understanding humanity’s origins, current
circumstances, and possible futures. Much of our current understanding
of life on our planet comes from observations about the rest of the
universe, and there remains much to learn, including considerations that
will affect our perceptions of existential risk. 287
Third, there may be as-yet undiscovered psychological
ramifications if humanity’s visual relationship with the stars is altered or
eventually cut off for the first time in our history. Direct exposure to
space objects, such as witnessing a planet through a telescope, appears to
have positive effects on creativity, awe, and respect for nature. 288
Conversely, the alteration of our sky may tend towards negative, riskraising traits such as reduced compassion. 289 In one imaginative story by
Isaac Asimov, characters on a planet perpetually bathed in sunlight
witness the stars for the first time—and it drives them mad. 290
As technology drives the costs of access to space lower,
increases in light pollution will likely accelerate. The number of satellites
is on track to triple by 2028. 291 Even a single mega-constellation like
SpaceX’s Starlink will radically affect the skies—if fully deployed,
Starlink satellites alone will visually outnumber the stars. 292 Because no
national or international laws address the issue, stakeholders currently
must rely on the goodwill of space actors to limit additional light
https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2019/11/27/this-is-why-we-cantjust-do-all-of-our-astronomy-from-space/#6e5433112704 (noting this is cheaper
than going to space).
286
Id.
287
See supra note 120 (describing the importance of the search for
extraterrestrial life in indirectly estimating existential risk).
288
See infra notes 255–258 and accompanying text (describing psychology
related to views of/from space).
289
See generally Analeigh Dao, Emotional and Social Responses to Stargazing:
What Does It Mean To Lose the Dark? (Honors Project at Ill. Wesleyan U.)
(2016), https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/psych_honproj/180/ (conducting
preliminary psychology experiments relating to stargazing).
290
ISAAC ASIMOV, NIGHTFALL (1941).
291
Therese Wood, Who Owns Our Orbit: Just How Many Satellites Are There in
Space?, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/visualizing-easrth-satellites-sapcespacex.
292
Brian Resnick, The Night Sky is Increasingly Dystopian, VOX (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2020/1/7/21003272/space-x-starlinkastronomy-light-pollution.
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pollution by refraining from launches and coating satellites in nonreflective material. 293 Space actors only marginally bear the costs of light
pollution but would fully bear the costs of mitigation—a classic public
goods problem.
Worse still is the prospect of obtrusive advertisements from
space. Companies for years have entertained the possibility of bright
space billboards rivaling the moon in size in brightness, 294 which led the
US to pass a domestic ban on obtrusive space advertising. 295 That did not
stop American company Rocket Lab from launching a bright, reflective
satellite designed solely to produce the brightest possible glint visible
from the Earth. The satellite, which was proudly proclaimed as being
“visible from anywhere on the globe” and the brightest object in the
night sky, 296 served no purpose besides creating publicity. 297
Astronomers criticized the launch as a form of “space graffiti.” 298 (The
company, headquartered in California, was able to bypass American law
by utilizing a subsidiary in New Zealand and launching from there,
demonstrating the issue of flags of convenience. 299)
Private advertising companies continue to capitalize on a
growing interest in space billboards. One Russian-based company, which
nearly secured a contract for an orbital advertisement with Pepsi, offers
the tagline: “Space has to be beautiful. With the best brands our sky will
amaze us every night.” 300 While Pepsi eventually abandoned the project
for fear of disapprobation, 301 there remains a need to bring private
initiatives into accordance with public interests, especially as the
commercial value of space skyrockets.
Id.
See, e.g., Greg Miller, It’s a Bird! A Plane! It’s an Ad? Billboard Idea
Launches Flight, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 4, 1993),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-08-04-mn-20350-story.html.
295
49 U.S.C. § 70109a (2010) (prohibiting obtrusive space advertising).
296
Michael McGowan, 'Space graffiti': astronomers angry over launch of fake
star into sky, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/26/space-graffiti-astronomersangry-over-launch-of-fake-star-into-sky.
297
The company stated that the mission was for public awareness, creating “a
bright symbol and reminder to all on Earth about our fragile place in the
universe.” Caleb Scharf, Twinkle, Twinkle, Satellite Vermin, SCI. AM. (Jan. 25,
2018), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/life-unbounded/twinkle-twinklesatellite-vermin/.
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McGowan, supra note 296.
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Id., see also supra Section II(C) (discussing flags of convenience).
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Jeff Foust, Pepsi Drops Plan to Use Orbital Billboard, SPACE.COM (Apr. 16,
2019), https://www.space.com/pepsi-drops-orbital-billboard-plans.html.
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4. Payload monitoring and forward contamination
In 2019, an Israeli space organization made history when it
became the first nongovernmental entity to place an object on the
Moon. 302 Unfortunately, it failed to stick the landing. When the
Beresheet lander crashed, it spilled its cargo across a portion of the lunar
surface. 303 Four months after the crash, the press discovered that among
the wreckage was a capsule containing human DNA samples and
tardigrade micro-animals, the only creatures known to be capable of
living in the vacuum of space. 304 The decision to include the samples was
made at the last minute by a single venture capitalist and not disclosed to
anyone—including the lunar lander operators—until after the crash. 305
Scientists lament that event may have compromised the Moon as a
“pristine environment” to conduct research and search for evidence of
extraterrestrial life, and legal experts point out that Article IX of the OST
requires states to prevent such contamination from occurring. 306 Still,
there was no legal fallout—in fact, the company quickly announced
plans for a second mission 307 and the venture capitalist, regarding his
mission as a success, proudly remarked, “I’m the first space pirate. . . .
We didn't tell them we were putting life in this thing. . . . Space agencies
don't like last-minute changes. So we just decided to take the risk.” 308

Christine Lundsford, Israel's 1st Moon Lander: The SpaceIL Beresheet Lunar
Mission in Pictures, SPACE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.space.com/43188israel-first-moon-lander-spaceil-beresheet-photos.html (explaining that
Beresheet was co-developed by a private nonprofit organization and an Israeli
state-owned corporation as part of the Google Lunar X Prize competition which
offered $30 million in prizes to the first privately funded teams to successfully
operate a rover on the Moon).
303
Daniel Oberhaus, A Crashed Israeli Lunar Lander Spilled Tardigrades on the
Moon, WIRED (Aug. 5, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/a-crashedisraeli-lunar-lander-spilled-tardigrades-on-the-moon/.
304
Id.
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Id.
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Kameron Virk, Tardigrades: 'Water Bears' Stuck on the Moon After Crash,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-49265125.
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Zachary Keyser, SpaceIL Heading Back to Space, Mission to Mars on the
Horizon, JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 28, 2019, 11:09 AM),
https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/SpaceIL-co-founder-Beresheet-II-ready-forlift-off-in-three-years-Mars-on-the-horizon-608939.
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Chris Taylor, ‘I'm the first space pirate!' How tardigrades were secretly
smuggled to the moon, MASHABLE (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://mashable.com/article/smuggled-moon-tardigrade.
302

49

SPACE AND EXISTENTIAL RISK: THE NEED
FOR GLOBAL COORDINATION AND CAUTION
IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 21

This was not the first time a launch included unauthorized
payloads. 309 In 2018, a Silicon Valley startup smuggled four satellites
onto an Indian rocket after being denied permission by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) due to the objects being too small
to reliably track in orbit. 310 Afterwards, the FCC Commissioner issued a
$900,000 fine, stating that “[t]he size of the penalty imposed is probably
not significant enough to deter future behavior, but the negative press
coverage is likely to prevent this company and others from attempting to
do this again.” 311 And yet just one week later the company successfully
raised twenty-five million dollars in funding to deploy 150 more of the
contraband satellites, based no doubt in part on the proven “success” of
its mission. 312
Payload monitoring is a crucial keystone in regulating the space
environment and enforcing space law. 313 As long as there is space
activity, there will always be some risk of individual actors evading or
bypassing authority. 314 Still, the risks are heightened where private actors
are permitted to shop for flag states unable or unwilling to closely
monitor, or where states themselves are not subject to oversight from a
centralized authority. 315
Aside from the importance of law and policy enforcement, the
existential concerns of poor payload monitoring and enforcement are
multifaceted. For example, it is not difficult to imagine the dangers that

Christopher D. Johnson et al., The Curious Case of the Transgressing
Tardigrades (part 1), SPACE REV. (Aug. 26, 2019),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3783/1.
310
Caleb Henry, FCC Fines Swarm $900,000 for Unauthorized Smallsat
Launch,, SPACENEWS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://spacenews.com/fcc-fines-swarm900000-for-unauthorized-smallsat-launch/.
311
Id.
312
Devin Coldewey, Swarm Technologies Raises $25M to Deploy its Own 150Satellite Constellation, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/24/swarm-technologies-raises-25m-to-deployits-own-150-satellite-constellation/.
313
Christopher D. Johnson et al., The Curious Case of the Transgressing
Tardigrades (part 2), SPACE REV. (Sep. 3, 2019),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3786/1.
314
See Fabrice Langrognet, A Brief History of Smuggling, BORDER
CRIMINOLOGIES BLOG (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/researchsubject-groups/centre-criminology/centrebordercriminologies/blog/2015/11/brief-history (describing the long history of
smuggling in other contexts).
315
See Section II(C) (describing the enforcement risks following from flags of
convenience).
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could come from various actors smuggling weapons of mass destruction
into space. 316
But the Beresheet example makes acute the risks even of
“forward contamination” from microorganisms like tardigrades. While
not directly threatening like back contamination might be, forward
contamination may indirectly have existential implications. In particular,
it may frustrate investigation into other celestial bodies, which is crucial
for understanding the Earth. 317 For example, the search for
extraterrestrial life may reveal important facts about humanity’s origins
and fate that help determine paths to existential security and navigate
around potential existential pitfalls. 318 But polluting Earth-based life
forms and DNA makes it much more difficult for scientists to discern
whether some organism originated on Earth or elsewhere. 319 Also,
contamination is functionally irreversible 320 and scientists may have
completely different needs dozens or hundreds of years from now. 321 The
scarcity of accessible asteroids, planets, and moons in our solar system
makes conservation of their unaltered and uncontaminated state
extremely valuable. 322
The current international legal regime is highly decentralized,
permitting states to develop their own payload monitoring practices. 323
At minimum, there is a need for international consensus and enforcement
of minimum standards for payload monitoring to avoid a race to the
bottom in national standards. Depending on how severe the risks are
from poor payload monitoring, it may even be best for space access to be
limited and internationally coordinated in order to ensure sufficient
oversight of what goes into (or comes out of) space.

See Section IV(A)(3) (discussing military and conflict risks). For a general
discussion of nuclear risks from nonstate actors, see Gary Ackerman & William
C. Potter, Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism: A Preventable Peril, in GLOBAL
CATASTROPHIC RISKS, supra note 102, at 402.
317
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 58.
318
Id. See also Bostrom, supra note 120 (discussing how the discovery of
extraterrestrial fossils—or lack thereof—should affect our belief that humanity
will go extinct).
319
Schwartz, supra note 5.
320
Id.
321
Id.
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Samuel Roth, Developing a Law of Asteroids: Constants, Variables, and
Alternatives, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 827, 864 (2016).
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See Section II(C) (discussing flags of convenience).
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5. Squandering of space resources
Currently, most space resources are subject to a classic tragedy
of the commons—nonexcludable and rivalrous. Individual space actors
therefore have incentives to exploit space resources quickly before others
do the same. For the finite resources in our solar system such as water (to
enable habitability), metals (for building structures), and energy sources
(for fueling space travel and habitats), the way humanity chooses to
allocate uses in the short-term may have crucial long-term repercussions.
The vast distances between solar systems and galaxies make it
exceedingly difficult to reach new stars and their planets—impossible
given current technologies, though perhaps feasible in the future. By
burning through our system’s resources before having the technology
necessary to put them to sufficiently high uses, humanity may be
inadvertently stranding itself, condemned to pass away before exploring
the rest of the universe, 324 perhaps at the hands of a steadily expanding
sun. 325
One researcher worries that the natural resources needed to
sustain a high-tech civilization are being used up, and if some cataclysm
destroys the technology we have, it may not be possible to climb back up
even to present levels. 326 Another hypothesizes that our “cosmic
commons” could be burnt up in a colonization race via self-replicating
mining drones. 327 While these are relatively long-term scenarios, they
have important implications for policymaking because near-term choices
may determine whether humanity goes down a track that inevitably leads
to these outcomes. For example, once a cosmic race has begun, it may be
difficult or impossible to stop—both for social and physical reasons. 328
ANDERS SANDBERG, STUART ARMSTRONG & MILAN ĆIRKOVIĆ, THAT IS NOT
DEAD WHICH CAN ETERNAL LIE: THE AESTIVATION HYPOTHESIS FOR
RESOLVING FERMI’S HYPOTHESIS 10–18 (2017) (discussing exploitable energy
sources and their limits).
325
Klaus-Peter Schröder & Robert Connon Smith, Distant Future of the Sun and
Earth Revisited, 386 MON. NOT. R. ASTRON. SOC. 155, 155 (2008).
326
Bostrom, supra note 95, at 11.
327
ROBIN HANSON, BURNING THE COSMIC COMMONS: EVOLUTIONARY
STRATEGIES FOR INTERSTELLAR COLONIZATION (1998); see also Bostrom, supra
note 95, at 14.
328
Anders Sandberg, Space Races: Settling the Universe Fast, FUTURE OF
HUMAN. INST. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/space-races-settling.pdf (“When occurring over large distances
the ability to enforce coordination disappears, and this means that if no or bad
ground rules were established before causal contact was lost there can be major
waste.”); Kevin Kohler, Cosmic Anarchy and Its Consequences, MEDIUM (Feb.
11, 2019), https://medium.com/@KevinKohlerFM/cosmic-anarchy-and-itsconsequences-b1a557b1a2e3.
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The only feasible way of avoiding these outcomes may therefore be to
prevent them from ever beginning. And “[t]here are good reasons to
think that the line of no return is located very early in space expansion
and that it might be very diﬃcult to avoid sliding across it.” 329
Unfortunately, humanity’s current trajectory points in the
direction of wasteful competition. In oceans, another open-access global
commons, overfishing continues to decimate economies and
ecosystems. 330 In space, countries and companies are already ramping up
for a race to acquire asteroid resources. Meanwhile, plans to establish
human settlements on moons and other planets will make gratuitous use
of in situ resources. Global coordination may be needed to bring space
resource usage into accordance with humanity’s long-term interests.
6. Economic acceleration or disruption
Proponents of space development sometimes point to the
economic gains that might come from harvesting space resources. 331
However, what is hailed as a virtue may in fact also be a threat. Faster
economic growth may well contribute to wellbeing 332 or altruistic
behaviors, 333 but it may also undermine existential security by
accelerating risky technological development or harmful practices like
environmentally destructive consumption before humanity is capable of
responsible management. 334 Emerging research seeks to determine

DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 363.
See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE
STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE: MEETING THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 91, CC License No. BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO (2018) (noting
that the percentage of fish harvested at unsustainable levels has risen from 10%
to 33% in just 40 years).
331
See, e.g., Weinzierl supra note 7, at 177 (stating that companies have
economic goals ranging from asteroid mining to colonizing the moon and Mars).
332
See generally Tyler Cowen, Caring about the Distant Future: Why it Matters
and What it Means, 74 U. CHIC. L. REV. 5 (2007); TYLER COWEN, STUBBORN
ATTACHMENTS: A VISION FOR A SOCIETY OF FREE, PROSPEROUS, AND
RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS (2018) (discussing effects of economic acceleration).
333
BENJAMIN FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1
(2005).
334
Leopold Aschenbrenner, Existential Risk and Growth 1 (Global Priorities
Inst., Working Paper No. 6, 2020); Kine Aurland-Bredesen, The Optimal
Economic Management of Catastrophic Risk (2019) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Norwegian University of Life Sciences) (on file with author); Philip Trammell,
Existential Risk and Exogenous Growth, GLOBAL PRIORITIES INSTITUTE 1, 1
(2021).
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whether faster economic growth generally increases or decreases
existential risk. 335
The benefit of economic growth comes from mitigating certain
“state” risks—getting through a “time of perils.” 336 At any given level of
progress (or “state”), we face a certain amount of existential risk—
currently, for example, from nuclear war, pandemics, and the like. 337
These risks, however, are likely temporary. 338 Once humanity has
progressed far enough, these risks could approach zero: Society could
become wise enough to take existential risks seriously, coordinate, and
act accordingly, leveraging safeguarding technologies to everyone’s
benefit. 339 Speeding up economic growth may reduce the total time spent
subject to these risks. 340
On the other hand, at given points in the trajectory of economic
development, transitions could occur that generate existential risks. 341
For example, humanity may uncover a technology so dangerous and easy
to use that extinction is nearly guaranteed to follow—perhaps artificial
general intelligence, or a mechanism allowing individuals to craft lethal
pathogens from their homes. 342 It may be better to slow down economic
growth so that dangerous transitions will happen later, after society has
sufficiently progressed to handle the risks. 343
Whether faster economic growth increases or decreases
existential risk seems to depend largely on how much overall existential
risk comes from being in dangerous states, on the one hand, or from
undergoing dangerous transitions, on the other. 344 The literature on this
topic is still young and developing. 345 Until we reach some clarity—
especially on near-term transition risks—it is probably better to avoid
introducing major economic disruptions in either direction. 346
For example, it may be wise to avoid rushing to harvest asteroids
for resources. Even a single asteroid can contain thousands of
Aschenbrenner, supra note 334, at 1.
Id.
337
Id.
338
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
341
Id. at 1–2.
342
Bostrom, supra note 132 143, at 461.
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Id. at 4.
345
See ORD, supra note 114, at 205–09 (summarizing issues related to
differential development).
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quintillions of dollars in resources such as rare metals. 347 Even setting
aside questions of transition risks in general, introducing such large
quantities of materials into the market may itself upset various
equilibria 348 and trigger a catastrophe, such as a war. 349 Of course, none
of these considerations matter much to individual actors chasing down
profits that might otherwise be claimed by someone acting more
quickly. 350 A lack of coordination incentivizes actors to pursue
economic-growth activities at a faster rate than may be safe. 351

V. PROPOSALS
I have argued that existential risk mitigation is overwhelmingly
important yet disturbingly neglected as a goal in space development law
and policy. The broadest concern is therefore to emphasize existential
security as the North Star in debates about law, policy, and academic
scholarship. While there are many other tractable interests at stake—
commercial, scientific, and geopolitical—these must be evaluated
through the lens of existential risk mitigation and sometimes give way to
the more important concern.
Space law and policy must evolve to give legal effect to the
importance of existential risk mitigation. International law, especially
space law, may be in a crucial formative period. The United Nations
recently announced a progressive new agenda focused on global and
long-term problems. 352 As a part of that agenda, a keystone conference in
2023 will include “a multi-stakeholder dialogue on outer space” for
governments to “seek high-level political agreement on the peaceful,

Shriya Yarlagadda, Economics and the Stars: The Future of Asteroid Mining
and the Global Economy, HARV. INT’L REV. (Apr. 8, 2022),
https://hir.harvard.edu/economics-of-the-stars.
348
Jeffrey S. Kargel, Metalliferous Asteroids as Potential Sources of Precious
Metals, 99 J. GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. 21129, 21129 (1994) (discussing a potential
market collapse); see also Andreas Schmidt & Daan Juijn, Economic Inequality
and the Long-Term Future 10–17 (Global Priorities Inst., Working Paper No. 4,
2021) (discussing the potential effects of economic inequality on existential
risk).
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See Stephen Walt, Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?
FOREIGN POLICY (May 13, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depressioneconomy-world-war/ (discussing the risks of geopolitical conflict from
economic disruption).
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secure and sustainable use of outer space.” 353 The United Nations
correctly notes that existing international arrangements provide “only
general guidance” on “the permanent settlement of celestial bodies and
responsibilities for resource management[,]” and the new agenda
considers a move toward “a global regime[.]” 354
This would be wise. I have argued that space is subject to glaring
externalities and collective action problems that make the current
uncoordinated approach irresponsible. One natural solution would be to
make space and its resources a closed-access commons, accessible only
by orderly international agreement. Such a regime is envisioned by the
1979 Moon Treaty which would declare the Moon the “common heritage
of [hu]mankind,” 355 a legal status that currently applies to the deep
seabed and ocean floor. 356
Under the common heritage framework, the deep seabed is
subject to a variety of provisions that ameliorate the risks that stem from
its being a global commons. As outlined in Table 2, these provisions as
applied to space and its resources may be helpful in reducing existential
risk along multiple fronts.
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355
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356
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353
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Common Heritage Element

Explanation

Space-Related Existential
Security Benefit

Non-appropriation by public
or private actors

All rights in the resources of
the Area are vested in
humankind as a whole; no
State can claim sovereignty
or sovereign rights over the
Area and its resources; no
private appropriation is
permitted.

Prevents race to acquire
resources with destructive
externalities such as space
debris.

Common management &
regulation

All resources and resourceextraction activities in the
Area are organized and
controlled by an international
authority on behalf of
humankind as a whole; the
rules, regulations, and
procedures are binding on all
member States, regardless of
individual consent.

Avoids coordination problems
such as dangerous practices
following from flags of
convenience.

Non-military purposes

The Area may only be used
for peaceful, non-military
purposes.

Reduces risk of geopolitical
conflict or development of
dangerous technology;
promotes confidence for
cooperation in other areas such
as those involving dual-use
technology.

Environmental protection
and preservation for future
generations

An international authority is
required to ensure effective
protection of the
environment from harmful
effects of activities, protect
and conserve the natural
resources of the Area, and
prevent damage to local
organisms that may exist in
the Area.

Reduces risk of contamination
(forward and back) and
squandering of cosmic
commons.
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Benefit-sharing
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Activities in the Area must
be carried out for the benefit
of humankind as a whole; an
international authority is to
provide for equitable sharing
of benefits derived from
activities in the Area, taking
into particular consideration
the interests of developing
States.
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Reduces the risks that follow
from economic inequality; 357
reduces likelihood of defectors
from international regime.

Table 2. Left and center columns adapted from Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage
of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed
and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise? 21 WISCONSIN INT’L L. J. 409, 411–413
(2003); Aline Jaeckel et al., Conserving the Common Heritage of Humankind—Options
for the Deep-Seabed Mining Regime, 78 MARINE POL. 150, 152 (2017).

The Moon Treaty itself already has considerable support with
eighteen state parties. 358 The United States’ influential opposition was
based on the Treaty’s perceived tension with free enterprise and private
property rights 359—concerns that may matter more from a nationalistic
perspective, but less from one focused on existential security. While
using the Moon Treaty’s common heritage approach as a model for a
future space law regime is certainly not a panacea, it is rare to find a
move whose many dimensions each plausibly stand to reduce existential
risk in different ways. There is a need for further thought into space law
regimes structured specifically around promoting international
coordination and minimizing existential risk, 360 as well as means of
generating State support for such proposals. 361
There is also in general a need for stronger consideration of
future generations. 362 For example, democratic institutions could
See Schmidt & Juijn, supra note 348, at 11–12 (describing the potential
existential risks of inequality).
358
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
359
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the
Comm. of Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong. (1980).
360
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, at 372 (describing numerous legal and policy
measures for minimizing existential risk related to space).
361
See, e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 232, 73–77 (identifying features of a
potential “Mars Treaty” that would promote international cooperation).
362
See, e.g., Beth Daley, How to create a government that considers future
generations, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 31, 2020),
https://theconversation.com/how-to-create-a-government-that-considers-future357
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incorporate stakeholder representation of future generations, perhaps
through constitutional provisions (as may arise under future space
settlements) addressing the paramount need to safeguard humanity’s
future and providing for appropriate enforcement mechanisms. 363
Similarly, it may be necessary to prohibit and punish deliberate
or reckless impositions of existential risk under international law. 364
International law is justified as an institution to protect basic human
rights—not just those that accrue to individuals, but also to humanity
collectively. If genocide is fit to be persecuted under international law,
then so too may be omnicide (the threatening of all current human life)
and postericide (the threatening of humanity’s future). 365
This approach would use international law to punish risky
behaviors, which is typically a function of domestic law. Countries
routinely punish risky activities, such as drunk driving, regardless of
whether an accident actually results. These laws usefully serve as ex ante
deterrents of costly behaviors. International law, on the other hand,
typically operates ex post to achieve accountability for misconduct that
has already caused actual harm. Unfortunately, an ex-post approach to
existential risk is inappropriate in part because extinction, should it
occur, would not leave anybody around to be punished. Laws against
imposing existential risks must therefore kick in at some point before
extinction occurs. The key question is where to place the probability
threshold for activities that are risky enough to merit punishment: too
low and the law would be overbearing; too high and the law would be
ineffective as a preventative measure. This task is not trivial, but it is
probably achievable. One scholar proposes that we can make imprecise
yet accurate determinations that the probability of an outcome has been
increased by some given conduct. 366 More consideration of similar
proposals is necessary.
generations-148947 (describing methods for enhancing governmental
consideration of future generations).
363
For considerations in constitutional drafting, see Thomas Ginsburg, Zachary
Elkins & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written Constitutions, U. CHI. L. SCH.,
Oct. 15, 2009, https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/lifespan-writtenconstitutions.
364
Catriona McKinnon, Endangering Humanity: An International Crime?, 47
CANADIAN J. PHILOSOPHY 395, 407–12 (2017) (arguing in favor of
incorporating a new offense of postericide into the body of international
criminal law).
365
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366
Henry Shue, Deadly Delays, Saving Opportunities: Creating a More
Dangerous World?, in CLIMATE ETHICS: ESSENTIAL READINGS 147–48 (2010).
Under this approach, for actions involving potential massive loss, the threshold
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Space law is a particularly good domain to consider adopting and
enforcing crimes against omnicide and postericide, not only because
space law is still fundamentally incomplete but also because space
activities overwhelmingly concern humanity’s future. If all goes well in
the very long term, the vast majority of human life (and humanity’s
descendants) will be elsewhere than Earth. This approach would give
direct legal effect to the fact that space is particularly important for future
generations.
In general, space is a promising realm for promoting unification
around humanity’s common interests. 367 While early space efforts may
have been primarily motivated by geopolitical competition, they
nonetheless inspired multitudes around the world to view Earth as tiny,
fragile, and connected. 368 Stories about space invite vivid imaginations of
humanity’s possible futures and bring into stark contrast the difficulties
facing us today. 369 Space policy has served as an effective vehicle for
international cooperation in the past (such as with the International Space
Station) and may continue to contribute to the development of a
planetary common identity, 370 but it may equally be used to promote
greed and worsen conflicts. 371 Anyone involved in space law and policy
(or anyone who might become involved, such as in democratic
processes) should consider ways to help encourage caution and
coordination, even—and especially—where we may require a sharp turn
away from our current trajectory. 372
*

*

*

likelihood of loss is met where a) the mechanism by which the losses would
occur is well understood, b) the conditions for the mechanism’s occurrence are
accumulating, and c) prevention costs are not excessive in light of the magnitude
of possible losses and other important demands on resources. Using this
approach, litigating questions of probability is unnecessary beyond establishing
that the conduct in question meets a certain minimal level of likelihood. Id.
367
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, 228, 256–57.
368
See supra notes 256–258 and accompanying text (describing historical
effects of early Earthrise photographs); see generally Alan Logan et al., Project
Earthrise: Inspiring Creativity, Kindness and Imagination in Planetary Health,
11 CHALLENGES 19 (2020) (discussing connections between space history,
utopian thinking, and imagination); SAGAN supra note 1 (discussing a vision of
shared humanity inspired by space).
369
Logan et al. supra note 368.
370
DEUDNEY, supra note 10, 228, 256–57.
371
Id. 366–81 (arguing that space is more likely to serve as a vehicle for greed
and conflict without a radical change in direction).
372
See, e.g., Kovic, supra note 232, *11–*12 (describing potential shifts in
space governance for existential risk mitigation from extraterrestrial
settlements).
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Isaac Asimov makes the point that it is entirely up to us whether
humanity experiences an existential catastrophe. 373 Crafting a responsible
body of space policy and law requires deliberate and persistent
dedication to safeguarding our future. This Article has been an attempt to
refocus discussions of space development in terms of what matters most.
While the current space law regime is rife with externalities and
collective action problems that generate existential risk, sensible changes
may help space instead become an eventual avenue for achieving
existential security.

ISAAC ASIMOV, A CHOICE OF CATASTROPHES: THE DISASTERS THAT
THREATEN OUR WORLD 362 (1979) (“[T]here are no catastrophes that loom
before us which cannot be avoided; there is nothing that threatens us with
imminent destruction in such a fashion that we are helpless to do something
about it. If we behave rationally and humanely; if we concentrate coolly on the
problems that face all of humanity, rather than emotionally on such nineteenth
century matters as national security and local pride; if we recognize that it is not
one’s neighbors who are the enemy, but misery, ignorance, and the cold
indifference of natural law—then we can solve all the problems that face us. We
can deliberately choose to have no catastrophes at all.”).
373

